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Preface
First, I would like to point out that the single-authored analysis of the effects of car-
tel ringleader discrimination in Chapter 2 is published in the Journal of Advanced
Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 1(5), pp. 26-42. Subsection 2.2
(Related literature), however, is not part of the publication. Further, the results
presented in Chapter 3 (effects of a price-regulatory intervention in retail gaso-
line markets) have partly been published in German as Berninghaus, S., Hesch,
M. & Hildenbrand, A., 2012. Zur Wirkung regulatorischer Preiseingriffe auf dem
Tankstellenmarkt. Wirtschaftsdienst 92(1), pp. 46-50.
Second, the analysis of decision-making under ambiguity in Chapter 4 is in large
parts identical to a current research paper written with Siegfried Berninghaus and
Stephan Schosser, researcher at the Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg. The
same goes for the joint work with Siegfried Berninghaus and Andreas Hildenbrand,
researcher at the University of Giessen, in Chapter 3. I am thankful for my coau-
thors’ permission to use our joint work as a part of this thesis. For reasons of
consistency, I will use first-person plural personal pronouns throughout all analyses.
Further, I am careful to point out my current position at the Bundeskartellamt
(German Federal Cartel Office). The views expressed in this thesis are mine alone,
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bundeskartellamt. All analyses are
based on economic experiments conducted at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
(KIT), Germany.
1
1 Introduction
"The time for more experiments has come, to explore the imperfection
of markets." Kenneth S. Rogoff in Handelsblatt (2012b)
Quite recently, in January 2012, Harvard professor Kenneth Rogoff urged academia
to critically review its research methods and to stronger rely on evidence from the
field of experimental economics. As "there are problems which cannot be solved
mathematically", Rogoff makes the point that economists needed to take into ac-
count various aspects from other disciplines in social sciences, such as politics or
history (see Handelsblatt (2012b)).
Likewise, and focusing exclusively on the domain of Industrial Organization (IO),
Normann and Ruﬄe (2011) emphasize the advantages of economic experimentation
in the introduction to one of the latest special issues of the International Journal
of Industrial Organization (IJIO, Vol. 29(1)). They report classroom experimen-
tation, theory testing and trials and simulations for decision-making in policy as
suitable areas of application in IO. As a general rule, since any difference in the
data is solely due to the variation of specific characteristics between the treatments,
experiments allow for clear-cut results and distinct causality explanation. More-
over, Normann and Ruﬄe (2011) ascribe experimental methods to even go beyond
confirming or refuting a theory as results often suggest extending or modifying ex-
isting theory. By addressing the possibility of observing "behavioral equilibrium
selection" in game-theory models with multiple equilibria, the authors argue in
favor of economic experimentation under controlled laboratory conditions in IO.
Experimental IO is also increasingly recognized by governmental institutions.
The U.S. Federal Communications Commission, for example, conducted an exper-
iment to shed light on the effect of changes in horizontal concentration among
cable operators on the flow of programming to consumers (see Bykowsky et al.
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(2002)). Further, the Bundeskartellamt (BKartA, German Federal Cartel Office)
took into account the results of various oligopoly experiments in its recent decision
on the merger case B9-13/10 "Magna/Karmann" (see Bundeskartellamt (2010, pp.
107ff.)). Moreover, numerous competition economists and competition law experts
who attended the 2011 Conference on Antitrust Law, hosted by the Bundeskartel-
lamt in Bonn, encouraged research into the effectiveness of price regulatory in-
terventions in retail gasoline markets by means of economic experimentation (see
Bundeskartellamt (2011c)).
In this thesis, we pick up on all the advantages mentioned above as we apply
experimental economics to three specific policy and regulatory issues which we
draw from the field of law and economics, especially from the rich domain of IO.
We run a simulation for decision-making in policy in our first study, followed by
an experimental analysis of a unique price regulatory mechanism established in
Austria. Third, we take into account cognitive psychology as we evaluate the results
of our third experiment on decision-making under ambiguity in an IO context.
The chapters of this thesis are organized as follows: We start off in Chapter
2, where we analyze the effects of discriminating cartel ringleaders from leniency
application. Ringleaders make significant contributions to enabling illegal collusive
agreements to function. According to U.S. legislation, they are excluded from
corporate leniency programs. Since 2002, under EU regulations, ringleaders may
qualify for a reduction of fines. To date, both antitrust laws treat cartel ringleaders
differently. Following a brief introduction of EU and U.S. antitrust law, we analyze
cartel agreed-upon prices, resulting market prices, cartel stability and deterrence
by evaluating the results of our first experiment.
In Chapter 3, we investigate pricing behavior under the so called Austrian rule.
Since the revised Gasoline Price Regulation Act came into effect on January 1, 2010
in Austria, increases in gasoline prices by gas station operators have only been pos-
sible once a day at 12 pm (noon). Price reductions, however, are permitted at any
time of the day. As the beneficial character of the Austrian Rule was challenged by
competition experts and the professional public, we analyze the regulation scheme
theoretically and experimentally.
We present our third experiment in Chapter 4, as we analyze decision-making
under ambiguity. In economic literature, authorities are primarily represented as
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a constant probability of detecting offenders. We introduce an explicit role for a
strategically acting authority and investigate the impact on misbehavior (corrup-
tion, by way of example) in an experiment. We implement treatments with either
a random selection mechanism or selection by direct human choice, thus turning a
risky situation into an ambiguous one. This setup is then extended by making the
risk of being detected depend inversely on the ratio of offenders.
In the final Chapter 5, we summarize the results of all presented analyses in this
thesis.
4
2 The Effects of Ringleader
Discrimination on Cartel
Deterrence and Stability
2.1 Introduction
By offering immunity from fines to the first cartel defector who continuously co-
operates with the authorities, so called leniency programs aim to generate distrust
among the participants of illegal collusive agreements. Every undertaking has an
incentive to cheat on one’s collaborators before anyone else benefits while everyone
else is fined. The term "leniency" refers to immunity from fines as well as a re-
duction in fines that would otherwise have been imposed (European Competition
Network, 2006).
The theoretical literature is still ambiguous about the impact of leniency pro-
grams. While Chen and Harrington (2007) and Harrington (2008) support the
destabilizing effects for the reason mentioned above, Spagnolo (2000) and Motta
and Polo (2003) also find stabilizing effects on collusive agreements. In his recent
contribution, Miller (2009) addresses this issue and points out that all the mod-
els depend on specific parameters that are unknowable theoretically. Miller (2009)
himself provides empirical evidence on the basis of reports issued over a 20-year
time span. He concludes that leniency programs enhance deterrence and positively
affect detection capabilities. Yet what is the perception of practical leniency appli-
cation? Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), finds leniency programs to be most
effective: "It is, unquestionably, the single greatest investigative tool available to
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anti-cartel enforcers" (Hammond, 2001). Although antitrust laws in the European
Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) rely on the same principles to generate
incentives to defect from an agreement, legislation still differs in some parts. See
Feess and Walzl (2005), Aubert et al. (2006) and Wils (2008) for an overview of
distinctive features of EU and U.S. leniency programs. In this contribution we
pay focused attention to the different treatment of cartel ringleaders. Bos and
Wandschneider (2011) discuss specific features that define (and thereby classify an
undertaking as) a cartel ringleader. By organizing meetings and being the driving
force of the conspiracy, ringleaders have a determining role within the arrangement
and thereby provide a platform for the cartel to work. Therefore, they are men-
tioned exclusively by numerous antitrust laws. According to the U.S. Corporate
Leniency Policy, an undertaking may be granted leniency if. . .
". . . the corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the
illegal activity and clearly was not the leader in, or the originator of the
activity."1
The EU adopted this ringleader exclusion rule when setting up the first Leniency
Policy in 19962. However, in contrast to the radical U.S. approach, EU legislation
has always recognized the cooperation of ringleaders and allowed for a fine reduc-
tion of up to 50%. For example, in the Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel3 the European
Commission identified ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. as the ringleader and main
instigator of the cartel (see recital 121) and it was granted a 30% fine reduction
(see recitals 173-174). Further, despite its determining role, Interbrew was granted
the "full" 50% fine reduction in the Interbrew and Alken-Maes4 case (see recital
357).
Hammond (2002) clarifies that the U.S. exclusion from immunity only applies
for the single organizer or single ringleader of a conspiracy. Likewise, the word-
ing of the first EU leniency program in 1996 was rather ambiguous. It left room
1See U.S. Department of Justice (1993), section A.6.
2European Commission (1996).
3European Commission, Decision of 21 October 1998 (COMP IV/35.691/E.4 — Pre-insulated
pipes, OJ L 24, 30/01/1999, pp. 1-70).
4European Commission, Decision of 5 December 2001 (COMP IV/37.614/F3 — Interbrew and
Alken-Maes, OJ L 200, 07/08/2003, pp. 1-58).
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for interpretation as to who exactly may be granted leniency. Therefore, the Euro-
pean Commission clarified the requirements for leniency applications to create legal
certainty in the 2002 Notice5. In doing so, the 2002 revision has become increas-
ingly lenient to defectors and even allows cartel ringleaders to participate in the
amnesty program (see Stephan (2008) and Billiet and Verma (2009) for discussions
and comparisons of the 1996 and 2002 legislation). Provided one is the first one
to come forward, the main requirement for qualifying for any immunity is "not to
have taken steps to coerce other undertakings to participate in the infringement".
As the conditions for immunity and reduction in fines were revised in 2006, we refer
to the current legislation as the program is still open for ringleader applications.
"An undertaking which took steps to coerce other undertakings to join
the cartel or to remain in it is not eligible for immunity from fines. It
may still qualify for a reduction of fines if it fulfils the relevant require-
ments and meets all the conditions therefor."6
In comparison, both jurisdictions agree not to grant immunity from fines to un-
dertakings that did coerce other participants to join the illegal activity. However,
cartel ringleaders are explicitly excluded only in the U.S. Corporate Leniency Policy,
but not according to EU legislation. Even within the EU member states, ringlead-
ers are treated differently by the national competition authorities (see Schroeder
and Heinz (2006)). Vennström (2010) provides insights into cartel enforcement in
Scandinavia. She points out that the national competition authorities of all nordic
countries may grant full immunity from fines to cartel ringleaders (also provided
they did not coerce other undertakings to join the infringement). In Germany on
the other hand, sole ringleaders and coercers alike are explicitly not eligible for
immunity from fines. However, according to Notice no. 9/2006 on the immunity
from and reduction of fines in cartel cases, a reduction of fines may be granted to a
cartel participant who does not meet the authority’s conditions for immunity. See
Bundeskartellamt (2006) for further details.
5See European Commission (2002), section A recital (11) c) and the European Commission
statement IP/02/247.
6See European Commission (2006a), section II A recital (13).
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We abstain from cartels with multiple ringleaders and analyze the impact of
ringleader discrimination (exclusion from leniency programs) in an economic ex-
periment using a repeated Bertrand game. Given a low probability of detection
through an authority, we find that excluding ringleaders from leniency (asymmet-
ric case) facilitates cartel formation, stabilizes collusion and leads to significantly
higher market prices. The opposite holds for a high probability of detection. Here,
the results are in line with the symmetric case when every player can apply for
leniency.
2.2 Related literature
Only very little is known about the treatment of cartel ringleaders and the effects
of ringleader discrimination, not to mention the (near) lack of contributions that
provide theoretical and empirical or experimental analyses. The literature provides
opinions and results which are rather mixed and argumentative. Our study is the
first experimental analysis which deals exclusively with this issue.
In this section, we will first briefly discuss the literature regarding the impact
of (a)symmetry on collusion and cooperation in 2.2.1. Then, we will provide an
overview of contributions presenting experimental evidence on leniency programs in
2.2.2 before we study the literature on cartel ringleaders to its full extent in 2.2.3.
2.2.1 (A)symmetries and collusion
The economic literature deals with the interaction of symmetry and collusion in
various ways. Mason et al. (1992) investigate (a)symmetric duopoly behavior in
an economic experiment. They design a cournot duopoly game where asymmetries
are characterized by differing costs (expressed by different payoff tables). They
point out that "asymmetry is currently regarded as a positive but highly subjective
attribute of market structures by the Department of Justice (DOJ)" (Mason et al.,
1992, p. 670) as collusion becomes more difficult in increasingly asymmetric mar-
kets. Fonseca and Normann (2008) vary the distribution of industry capacity in a
price-setting oligopoly experiment with constant demand. They compare symmet-
ric and asymmetric markets and find symmetric markets to yield higher prices. This
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result is consistent with further experimental studies by Compte et al. (2002) (ca-
pacity constraints), Kühn (2004) (differentiated products) and Vasconcelos (2005)
(cost asymmetries), as they all agree, that asymmetries hinder collusion.
The heterogeneity of firms in cartels is addressed by Rothschild (1999). Theoret-
ically, he analyzes cartel stability and the use of trigger strategies in a framework
with linear demand and n firms, where each firm operates subject to one of n pos-
sible cost functions. Rothschild (1999, p. 729) finds that "the effectiveness of the
strategy as a deterrent to deviation depends crucially, and in a potentially quite
complex way, upon the relative efficiencies of the deviant and the loyalists". How-
ever, he also points out that all results “depend to a large extent on the particular
form of the demand and cost functions” which are employed. There are also more
recent contributions relating to this approach by each implementing either different
(1) capacities, (2) marginal costs or (3) products (Baranowska-Prokop (2010), Bos
and Harrington (2010) and Paha (2010)).
2.2.2 Leniency experiments
There are several contributions investigating the effectiveness of leniency programs
by means of economic experimentation. Apesteguia et al. (2007) use a one-shot
Bertrand game and do not implement investigations by an antitrust authority, e.g.
a certain probability of detection. Thus, the duopoly cartel can only be detected
if one player applies for leniency (as punishment for the deviating collaborator).
In case both players apply for leniency, the fine reduction is split between both of
them. Apesteguia et al. (2007) find a decrease in prices when a leniency program is
in place. However, cartel activity in the leniency treatment does not differ compared
to their standard treatment, which was set up to capture antitrust law prior to the
introduction of leniency clauses.
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) report their results to be complementary to
those presented by Apesteguia et al. (2007), as they also play a homogeneous good
Bertrand pricing game. Yet, their experiment differs fundamentally in various ways.
First, Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) analyze the results of an experiment with
repeated interaction. Second, the authors introduce an antitrust authority. Groups
that discuss prices are (successfully) investigated with a probability of 15 %. Third,
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they extend the stage game introduced in Apesteguia et al. (2007) by one player
and capture the order of leniency applications. In this way, they induce a "race
to report", as only the first reporting player is granted full immunity from fines.
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) argue in favor of leniency programs as their results
suggest fewer cartels (a deterrent effect) and lower market prices if reporting price
discussions is possible.
While Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) restrict price discussions to electronically
exchanging accepted (market-)price ranges, Dijkstra et al. (2012) allow for unre-
stricted communication in their leniency experiment. Moreover, they offer cartel
members the possibility to apply for leniency before or after an investigation has
been opened. By implementing leniency treatments called "Profound" and "Su-
perficial", the authors allow for either a small number of profound investigations
(probability of investigation: 20%, probability of detection: 75%) or a large number
of superficial investigations (probabilities inverted). Like Hinloopen and Soetevent
(2008), Dijkstra et al. (2012) find leniency programs hinder cartel formation. Av-
erage market prices decrease in their experiment, too. The authors find more
instances of reporting if investigations are carried out profoundly.
Bigoni et al. (2009) adopt differentiated goods Bertrand competition in their
leniency experiment. The authors investigate the effects of the level of fines in
different leniency programs on pricing behavior and cartel deterrence. They also
study the outcome in case rewards are given to reporting cartel members. This
type of a somewhat courageous leniency program is suggested by one of the coau-
thors in Spagnolo (2000). Based on the results of the experiment, Bigoni et al.
(2009) suggest that antitrust enforcement without leniency programs reduces car-
tel formation, but increases cartel prices. Rewards successfully provide incentives
to self-report, which, according to the authors, seems to be the only welfare en-
hancing policy. As the experiment was run in Stockholm and Rome, the authors
also report on the influence of cultural differences. Bigoni et al. (2009) analyze the
effects of excluding cartel ringleaders from leniency application in their ringleader
treatment. We discuss the outcome below.
In a recent leniency study, Hamaguchi et al. (2009) force subjects to collude as
they analyze leniency programs in a situation where firms have already committed
to an agreement. The authors report most groups to quickly terminate collusion
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when they are given to possibility to report the infringement. They find that dis-
trust increases with group size as larger groups have more difficulties in maintaining
collusion. Like Bigoni et al. (2009), the authors find rewards to positively affect
instances of reporting and cartel breakdown.
For reasons of completeness, we mention the studies by Hamaguchi et al. (2007)
and Hinloopen and Onderstal (2011). Both contributions use a first price auction
framework to analyze collusion and leniency in an economic experiment.
2.2.3 Cartel ringleader discrimination
Although each respective approach differs slightly, all experimental studies reviewed
above draw a conclusion and basically confirm the effectiveness of leniency pro-
grams. Despite the amount of research that was recently conducted, only very
little is known about the effects of excluding cartel ringleaders from leniency ap-
plication. Almost all statements are rather argumentative. Leslie (2006), for ex-
ample, describes ringleaders to be trustworthy partners in crime. As they have
less (or nothing) to gain by reporting the cartel, they are highly unlikely to reveal
the agreement to the authorities. If they were, however, eligible for immunity, un-
certainty and distrust would rise among other cartel members. This is a positive
feature for antitrust authorities as, according to Leslie (2006, p. 480), "fear deters
cartelization".
Herre and Rasch (2009) take into account the role of a ringleader in their theory
model. Given homogeneous goods and constant marginal costs, the authors first
assume cartelists (n ≥ 3) share the collusive profit equally in a game with an infinite
horizon. As one player is endogenously (randomly) chosen to be the ringleader
who is excluded from leniency application, players face asymmetric profits. An
antitrust authority is in place and reviews the industry with a given probability.
On the one hand, the authors find ringleader exclusion sustains cartel stability if
the industry is reviewed with a low probability. Thus, they argue that (in this case)
ringleaders should be able to participate in the program. On the other hand, if the
authority commits to a high review probability, ringleader exclusion decreases cartel
sustainability as ringleaders face higher fines (asymmetry) if they are convicted.
In a fully revised version of the aforementioned working paper, the authors pay
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focused attention to the amount of evidence a ringleader holds in Herre et al. (2012).
Under the plausible assumption that a ringleader holds more evidence about the
agreement than an ordinary cartel member, Herre et al. (2012) deduce an increased
probability of successfully convicting the cartel if the ringleader cooperates with
the authorities. On the basis of their theory model, the authors find a deterrent
effect of ringleader discrimination when the ringleader’s evidence is relatively low.
However, ringleader discrimination does not to matter when the ringleader’s evi-
dence is relatively high. Then the cartel situation compensates the ringleader in a
way which does not give an incentive to blow the whistle.
In their recent contribution, Bos and Wandschneider (2011) provide a survey of
identified ringleaders in European cartel cases and analyze the effects of ringleader
ineligibility in a theoretical model. They conclude their formal analysis with the
indication that under some conditions, disqualifying ringleaders from leniency tends
to yield higher prices.
Solely Bigoni et al. (2009) provide experimental evidence on cartel ringleader
discrimination. In their ringleader treatment, the player who initiates a price dis-
cussion is treated as the ringleader. Compared to their leniency treatment, they do
not find lower rates of communication attempts. Moreover, cartel groups present
themselves to be rather stable. In addition, cartels successfully charge higher mar-
ket prices in the ringleader treatment.
2.3 Hypothesis
Despite numerous studies that agree on asymmetries to hinder collusion, we follow
the literature (as mentioned above) that is more closely related to cartelization and
antitrust policy design. We provide hypotheses regarding the effects of ringleader
discrimination on market prices and cartel activity as well as cartel stability.
In the Ringleader Treatment of their leniency experiment, Bigoni et al. (2009)
find an insignificant deterrence effect and comparatively higher market prices. Bos
and Wandschneider (2011) also conclude their formal analysis with the indication
that under some conditions, disqualifying ringleaders from leniency tends to yield
higher prices. We take these results into account and formulate two hypotheses:
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H1: Market prices are higher in an asymmetric setting than in a sym-
metric setting.
However,
H2: Cartel formation does not differ between an asymmetric setting
and a symmetric setting.
This means that cartels that do form in the asymmetric setting are rather stable
and successfully realize higher market prices. Indeed, the literature suggests that
cartels are more stable when excluding ringleaders from leniency application. For
example, Bigoni et al. (2009) provide experimental evidence for cartel stabilization.
Ringleader eligibility is also discussed by Leslie (2006). He explains that the "suc-
cess" of the cartel lies in the trustworthiness of the player who is not able to report.
Vice versa, he argues that antitrust enforcement would benefit from another player
that might expose the cartel. Non-discriminatory policies increase distrust, and
thus, instances of reporting. With regard to cartel stability we hypothesize:
H3: There is more deviation from agreed-upon prices in a symmetric
setting than in an asymmetric setting.
H4: There are more instances of reporting in a symmetric setting
than in an asymmetric setting.
In the cartel experiment conducted by Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008), non-
binding price discussions (cartel situations) lead to higher market prices than in
situations when players do not discuss prices (non-cartel situations, competition).
No matter the (a)symmetry, we expect to obtain the same results and therefore
formulate the hypothesis:
H5: Groups that do have non-binding price discussions realize higher
market prices than groups that do not discuss prices.
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Non-discriminatory leniency policies allow for one more player to report, defect
and reveal the cartel. According to Herre and Rasch (2009), this increases the
(otherwise relatively low) probability that an antitrust authority prosecutes a car-
tel (see Hypothesis H4). They postulate, that this reasoning (recognizing cartel
ringleaders for leniency application) may not hold if the authority (already) audits
the industry with a high probability of detection. The asymmetries regarding dif-
ferent profits then (negatively) outweigh the positive effect of increased detection
capabilities through instances of reporting. We hypothesize:
H6: There is no difference between a symmetric setting with a low
probability of detection and an asymmetric setting with a high proba-
bility of detection.
2.4 The experiment
2.4.1 Game design
Our design shares the basic structure of the game used in the leniency experiments
conducted by Bigoni et al. (2009) and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008). However,
we make some minor modifications which will be discussed below. A repeated
Bertrand game (as introduced by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000)) is played in
groups consisting of three players i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. By individually choosing an integer
of the choice set {101, 102, ..., 110}, the group enters Bertrand competition as only
the player with the lowest price receives net earnings of
pmin − 100
L
(2.1)
where L is the number of players that choose the same (lowest) price at the same
time. The deduction of 100 can be interpreted as a constant cost of production.
pmin is considered to be the market price. Any price p > pmin will not yield any
earnings. pN = 101 is the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. We allow non-
binding price discussions before market price submissions. While every price p > pN
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is considered to be noncompetitive, we rely on a price discussion to take place
in order to form a cartel. Spagnolo (2004) and Aubert et al. (2006) describe the
antitrust authority’s need for hard evidence to charge undertakings for cartelization.
Apesteguia et al. (2007) and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) apply this notion in
their cartel experiments, as do we.
In more detail, the game can be divided into three stages, namely (1) communi-
cation phase, (2) market phase, and (3) reporting phase. This timing of the stage
game is widely accepted in the theoretical literature on cartel formation (Spagnolo,
2004). In a computerized experiment, participants play this game repeatedly. One
period is structured as follows:
Stage 1 (communication phase): All group members simultaneously decide
whether to join price discussions, or not. If at least one player does not participate,
the group faces standard Bertrand competition and all players simultaneously set
(market) prices without a possibility of reporting or the risk of being audited by
an authority. Hence, a cartel is established if all three players agree to participate
in the price discussion. Thereby, we do not allow the formation of partial cartels.
The decision to participate is private information. Players only learn if a cartel is
established, or not. If there is unanimous agreement to join talks, a communication
screen opens which allows for price discussions. All players simultaneously choose
a price range from the choice set {101, 102, ..., 110}. Individually, they enter the
minimum and maximum price of the price range they accept. As suggested by Haan
et al. (2009), players are only able to submit prices (in numbers) and nothing else.
The intersection of all three price ranges is instantly shown to all players and they
may again enter minimum and maximum prices. If the same number is submitted
as both the minimum and maximum value, the price is locked. We allow price
discussions until either (1) a single agreed-upon price is reached, (2) one player
decides to quit the discussion, or (3) 30 seconds have passed. In both cases (2) and
(3), the discussion is terminated without an agreement, the communication screen
closes and no further coordination is possible for all players. We declare a cartel to
be formed anyway, as coordination was possible and "hard evidence" is created.
Stage 2 (market phase): The agreed-upon price (Stage 1) is non-binding. All
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players now simultaneously set a price from the choice set {101, 102, ..., 110}. The
lowest of the three prices is considered to be the market price which is then an-
nounced to every player.
Stage 3 (reporting phase): If a cartel is established in Stage 1, players have
the possibility to report the collusive agreement. Every report costs one ECU
(experimental currency unit), regardless of whether leniency is granted or not. This
resembles administrative costs, legal fees, et cetera and prevents "free punishment".
If reported, all players (except the reporting one) face a reduction of 10% of current
period revenues. In case no player reports the participation in price talks, an
authority audits the group with a probability of detection of δ ∈ {0.15, 0.75}. The
players will also face a reduction of 10% of current period revenues if the audit is
successful and the cartel is detected.
Total earnings are updated every period. They are visible at all times. In a final
step, all players (individually but simultaneously) learn all relevant information
about the period of the game: (1) submitted price, (2) market price, (3) current
period revenues, (3) revenue deduction, (4) reporting costs, and (5) current period
net earnings.
Compared to the experiment by Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) we do not pay
attention to the sequence of reports after the first report is made. While they
grant fine reductions for second and third reports, we only grant fine reductions to
the first reporter, where a 100% reduction is immunity from fines. Our approach
is sufficient to induce a race to report, figuratively to be the first one in the court
room. In addition, we abstain from the possibility of fining subjects for cartelization
in previous periods. Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) allow this notion (the fine
liability is carried over to the next period) but cartels do not last longer than one
period as they break down by either defection, report or audit in their Leniency
Treatment. Bigoni et al. (2009) also study a Ringleader Treatment. The ringleader
role is assigned to the subject who first joins a discussion (initiates it). The authors
do, however, point out that they eliminate the race to report as only one subject
is allowed to report in their duopoly game. Our game is designed for three players
and the ringleader role is assigned randomly each period. Like Hinloopen and
Soetevent (2008), we use a detection probability of δ = 15% which can be ascribed
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to the empirical analysis by Bryant and Eckard (1991). Although numerous studies
estimate the cartel overcharge to be significantly higher than 10% (OECD (2002),
Connor and Lande (2005), Veljanovski (2007)), the imposed fine corresponds to
current EU legislation7 which allows a maximum of 10% of the sum of the total
turnover. According to the Guidelines Manual of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
(USC)8, the U.S. doubled the 10% to increase deterrence (Connor and Lande, 2005).
For an overview of fines loads in EU, U.S. and other countries, see Connor (2010).
For reasons of comparability with other experimental studies on cartel deterrence,
we fine cartelists f = 10% of their revenue.
2.4.2 Experimental design
To analyze the effects of ringleader discrimination, we implement a total of four
treatments and pick up the analysis where Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) left off.
The structure of their Leniency Treatment resembles our Symmetric Treatment
(SYM), where all players may communicate and have the possibility to report the
cartel. Also, an antitrust authority is in place, auditing the group with a detection
probability of 15%. The fine load upon detection or report is f = 10% of current
period revenues. Only the reporting player receives immunity from fines. In the
Asymmetric Treatment (ASYM), only one aspect differs in comparison to SYM.
Cartel ringleaders may not report the collusive agreement. In addition we run the
AsymmetricHIGH Treatment (ASYMhigh). Like in ASYM, cartel ringleaders are
unable to report. If none of the remaining players reports in ASYMhigh, the author-
ity investigates with a high probability of detection (75%). δ = 0.75 corresponds
to the probability of detection used by Dijkstra et al. (2012) to simulate profound
governmental cartel investigations. The structure of the Asymmetric50 Treatment
(ASYM50) is half way between SYM and ASYM. Here, cartel ringleaders may re-
port the cartel. However, they are not granted a full fine reduction as in SYM, but
a 50% fine reduction (f50 = 0.5 × f), provided the ringleader is the first player to
come forward. We present an overview of the treatments in Table 2.1. The fine
reductions shown in Table 2.1 apply only for first reporting cartel-ringleaders. All
7See European Commission (2006b), recital 32.
8See U.S. Sentencing Commission (2010), § 2R1.1(d)(1).
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other first reporting players are granted immunity in any case.
Symmetric Asymmetric
Fine reduction 100% 50% X
Low probability of detection (15%) SYM ASYM50 ASYM
High probability of detection (75%) ASYMhigh
Table 2.1: Classification of treatments
We ran a computerized experiment which was programmed and conducted with
the z-Tree application developed by Fischbacher (2007). We used neutrally worded
instructions (for a between-subject design) and avoided "hard" terms like antitrust,
cartel, fines, et cetera (see Appendix B.1). However, the discussion about prices
and the collusive character of the game was completely understandable. Also, the
differentiation of the roles was obvious. As mentioned above, our experiment is
very closely related to the experiment by Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008). Thus,
our leniency program is non-exploitable, too. Per-period cartel profits are higher
than per-period profits when applying for leniency. Simplifying (110 − 100)/3 −
δ × f × 110/3 > (110 − 100)/3 − 1 − 0.5 × f × 110/3 reduces the inequality to
(δ − 0.5)× f × 110/3 < 1, which is always true. The inequality holds for δ = 0.15
in SYM, ASYM or ASYM50 and δ = 0.75 in ASYMhigh, as well as f = f50 in
ASYM50. Remember that the deduction of one ECU stands for reporting costs.
Because of the possible reduction of current period revenues, subjects can also
realize negative earnings: Assume a cartel is established. Now, one player sets her
market price (pindividual = 108) below the agreed-upon cartel price (pcartel = 109)
and does not apply for leniency (whereas another player reports). She would then
earn (108− 100)− 0.1× 108 = −2.8 ECU in this period.
With regard to the race to report, participants quickly learn the position of the
report button and might already place the courser before the actual report screen is
shown. We randomly switch the order of the report and non-report buttons in our
computerized design. Hence, subjects still have to make their decision consciously,
if not even more consciously.
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To avoid possible endgame effects, we end sessions probabilistically. After 20
periods, the session ends with a probability of 20% or another period starts. As for
the results, we only analyze the first 20 periods.
2.4.3 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics
at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). Subjects were recruited via ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004) and a total of 183 students across all fields of study took part in
the experiment. There were 61 groups of three participants. We have 18 groups
(observations) in SYM, 20 in ASYM, 11 in ASYMhigh and 12 in ASYM50. After
welcoming the subjects to the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to
visually isolated computer terminals. The instructions were read aloud and all
questions were answered privately. Participants were matched into groups of three
and had to play five practice periods before the experiment started. All groups
were re-matched afterwards and all participants knew that they would play within
the same group until the end of the actual experiment. Earnings of the practicing
periods were not added to the cumulative earnings of the experiment. Subjects
were paid anonymously at the end of each session. All sessions lasted between 60
and 90 minutes. With a total of e 1776.98 earned, average earnings were e 9.71
with a minimum payment of e 2.01 and a maximum of e 23.83, respectively. All
payments include a e 5.00 show-up fee which was available during the experiment
to avert possible losses. Nevertheless, two participants (1.1%) realized negative
overall earnings (e 1.04 in a SYM session and e 1.35 in an ASYM session). Both of
them paid the respective amount to the experimenter voluntarily and said they were
always aware of the risks of their actions. Therefore, we include those participants
in the overall sample of subjects and recognize the outcomes for our analysis.
2.5 Results
The results are divided in three subsections on (2.5.1) pricing, (2.5.2) cartel activity
and (2.5.3) cartel stability. We evaluate Hypotheses H1-H5 by analyzing the data
from the SYM- and ASYM-Treatments (18 observations in SYM and 20 observa-
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tions in ASYM) before we present additional evidence from our ASYMhigh- and
ASYM50-Treatment in subsection 2.5.4 and 2.5.5, respectively.
2.5.1 Pricing
We first analyze resulting market prices to evaluate Hypothesis H1. Average mar-
ket prices per period are shown in Figure 2.1a. While average market prices in
all treatments of the experiment by Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) decrease over
time, participants in our experiment succeed in maintaining a certain level (stan-
dard deviations are σ = 0.447 in SYM and σ = 0.668 in ASYM). Making one
player ineligible for immunity from fines in ASYM (and thereby maximizing the
asymmetry) appears to result in higher average market prices. The non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test confirms that average market prices in SYM are
significantly lower than average market prices in the ASYM Treatment (p < 0.01).
Average market price per period (left panel) and cumulative distribution function of
market prices (right panel)
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Figure 2.1: Market prices
Figure 2.1b appends to this finding as we have a look at the plot of the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of market prices. We consider the distributions of market
prices in the SYM and ASYM Treatments, characterized by the cdfs Fsym and
Fasym, respectively. The stochastic dominance between the cdfs holds if Fsym(y) ≥
Fasym(y), for any market price y ∈ {101, 102, ..., 110}. Obviously, the cdf of market
prices in the ASYM Treatment holds first-order stochastic dominance over the cdf
of market prices in the SYM-Treatment. In Figure 2.1b we find the cdf of the
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ASYM Treatment always below the cdf of the SYM-Treatment. This means that
prices are higher in ASYM. We test for first-order stochastic dominance and take as
independent observations the average market prices over all 20 periods per group.
A one-sided MWU test then confirms the assessment (one-sided, p < 0.01).
To analyze the possible success of cartelization (Hypothesis H5), Figure 2.2 illus-
trates the cdfs of market prices divided into cartel and non-cartel groups. As ex-
pected, cdfs of market prices of cartel groups (CART-SYM and CART-ASYM) have
unambiguous, first-order stochastic dominance over the corresponding non-cartel
cdf. The MWU test confirms the difference with p < 0.01 for both, the symmetric
and asymmetric treatment. Because of that and regardless of the (a)symmetry,
groups that engage in discussions are more successful in realizing higher market
prices than groups that do not discuss prices before individually setting a price in
the market stage. Moreover, comparing both cartel cdfs, groups that form a cartel
in ASYM are able to charge higher prices than cartels in SYM. The cdf of market
prices of SYM cartel groups is first order stochastically dominated by the cdf of
market prices of ASYM cartel groups (one-sided MWU test, p = 0.015).
Cumulative distribution function of market prices in cartel and non‐cartel groups
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution function of market prices in cartel and non-
cartel groups
Non-cartel groups in the symmetric treatment charge prices closest to the Nash
equilibrium with nearly 90% of all chosen prices being 101. Looking closer at the
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NON-CART-SYM cdf, the 7.3% increase from 109 to 110 can be ascribed to one
group only. Six times they managed to realize the highest market price of 110
through tacit collusion. After one player deviated, they never coordinated to 110
again, as all trust was gone. In summary, we find significantly higher average
market prices in the asymmetric treatment. Even by only looking at cartel prices,
groups in ASYM are able to realize higher prices than SYM cartels. It seems that
players distrust each other less in a cartel where one player is unable to report the
conspiracy.
2.5.2 Cartel activity
The overall fraction of cartels is 31.9% in SYM and 54.3% in ASYM. According
to our research Hypothesis H2, there is no difference between SYM and ASYM
with respect to cartel formation. Considering 18 groups in SYM and 20 groups
in ASYM for a 20-period analysis, a one-sided MWU test confirms that cartel
formation in ASYM is significantly higher than in SYM (one-sided MWU test,
p < 0.01). Therefore, we reject Hypothesis H2.
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Figure 2.3: Cartel activity
Figure 2.3a shows the fraction of subjects who wish to form a cartel. With 20-
period means of 68.9% in SYM and 80% in ASYM, we find a high willingness to
participate in price talks. However, as illustrated in Figure 2.3b, there are fewer
cartels in SYM because in the majority of the SYM groups, only two participants
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want to discuss prices. Since, according to our notion, a cartel is formed when three
players unanimously agree to discuss prices, we find the fractions of cartels (31.9%
and 54.3%) in the right columns of Figure 2.3b. The fractions, of course, add up
to 1 in each treatment.
The plot of Figure 2.4 illustrates the cdfs of the number of times subjects want
to join a discussion. Whereas in ASYM, subjects want to discuss prices at least
four times, in SYM, 3.7% of all subjects do not want to discuss prices at all.
Furthermore, the cdf of the individual willingness to join talks in SYM is first-
order stochastically dominated by the cdf to join talks in ASYM. This means that
subjects in ASYM individually want to join talks more often than in SYM. This
result is contrary to the findings of Bigoni et al. (2009), as there, compared to
their Leniency Treatment, the rates of communication attempts in the Ringleader
Treatment are insignificantly lower.
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Figure 2.4: Cumulative distribution function of the number of periods individual
subjects want to collude
2.5.3 Cartel stability
For the analysis in this subsection, we focus on cartel groups only. In case a cartel
is formed, 92.6% of the groups in SYM coordinate to an agreed-upon price of 110.
So do 95.7% of the groups in ASYM. See Figure A.1 on page 95 for the the cdfs
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of the agreed-upon prices by cartel groups. There is no significant difference in
the outcome of price discussions (two-sided MWU test, p = 0.508). However, in
subsection 2.5.1 we observe that SYM cartels charge significantly lower market
prices than ASYM cartels. This indicates that subjects undercut prices in SYM
more often than in ASYM. As there are more reasons why cartelization must not
always be successful, we evaluate three causes for cartel breakdown: (1) a player
deviates from the agreed-upon price to keep all the earnings of the current period,
(2) at least one player reports the participation in price talks, and (3) the cartel
is detected by the authority with probability δ = 15%. Table 2.2 summarizes the
causes of cartel breakdown.
Fraction of reasons for break down
Deviation Reporting Detection
SYM 0.67 0.58 0.04
ASYM 0.51 0.41 0.08
Table 2.2: Causes of cartel breakdown
The majority of all cartels break down because one player deviates from the
agreed-upon price. However, there is significantly less undercutting in ASYM (51%)
than in SYM (67%) (one-sided MWU test, p = 0.09). We obtain similar results re-
garding the breakdown because of reports. In SYM, 58% of all cartels are reported.
A report happens for three reasons: (1) because a player deviates from the agreed-
upon price (punishment or self protection for the undercutting player), or in case
the cartel survives (with the market price being the agreed-upon price), because of
the fear (2) another player might report first or (3) the authority might uncover the
conspiracy. Compared to ASYM (41%), subjects in SYM report price discussions
more often (58%), which indicates a high level of distrust among cartelists. How-
ever, behavioral differences are not significant (two-sided MWU test, p > 0.10). Our
result confirms Hypothesis H3, but we reject H4. Nevertheless, cartels in ASYM,
where cartel ringleaders are excluded from leniency application, seem to be more
stable. Asymmetry appears to stabilize the cartel as the ringleader is trustworthy
when not being able to report. The right column of Table 2.2 shows, that only very
few cartels are detected after players neither deviate nor report the cartel.
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2.5.4 High probability of detection
Concluding their formal analysis, Herre and Rasch (2009) suggest that ringleader
exclusion does increase the sustainability of collusion. Our results confirm this view
as we find less deviation from the agreed-upon price as well as a lower fraction of
instances of reporting in the ASYM Treatment than in the SYM Treatment (see
Table 2.2). Moreover, Herre and Rasch (2009) postulate that the opposite holds if
the authority audits with a high probability of detection. Hamaguchi et al. (2009)
present various studies that deem the probability of detection to be unrealistically
high in order for cartel members to even report a cartel.
In this subsection, we analyze the results of the ASYMhigh-Treatment where we
raise the detection probability from δ = 15% in ASYM to δ = 75% in ASYMhigh.
Figure 2.5b shows that the cdf of prices in ASYM is stochastically dominated in
the second-order sense by the cdf of prices in SYM as the cumulative difference
(D(z) for all z ∈ {101, .., 110}) between the cdfs drops below zero. However, the
difference in average market prices over all 20 periods is not significant (two-sided
MWU test, p = 0.379). The MWU test also confirms that there is no difference
in average market prices per period (Figure 2.5a) between SYM (18 observations)
and ASYMhigh (11 observations) as we obtain a p-value of 0.367 (two-sided).
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Figure 2.5: Market prices
Cartel formation in ASYMhigh is not significantly different from cartel formation
in SYM (two-sided MWU test, p = 0.231). Furthermore, the fraction of subjects
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that deviate from an agreement (66%) is about the same as in SYM. 78% of those
groups that do have price talks are reported afterwards, whereas only 4.9% of all
cartels are detected by the authority. Still, this is 22.2% of the cartels that were
not reported. All results of this subsection are in line with our Hypothesis H6.
2.5.5 50% reduction of fines
So far, our analysis has focused on a 100% fine reduction for cartel ringleaders.
Now, we again assume a (leading) defector that fully cooperates with the authority.
She therefore receives a fine reduction of 50% which is in line with the current
practice of the European Commission. Furthermore, a fine reduction - but no
immunity from fines - may be granted to ringleaders by the German Federal Cartel
Office. The amount of the reduction is based on the value of the contribution to
uncovering the illegal agreement as well as the sequence of the applications from
all cartel members (Bundeskartellamt, 2006). Bos and Wandschneider (2011, Table
1) provide an overview of ringleader cases and fine reductions between 2000-2010.
To analyze the effect of a 50% fine reduction for cartel ringleaders, we look at the
data from the ASYM50 Treatment. Adapting both hypotheses H1 and H2 to this
situation, resulting market prices and cartel formation should be inbetween the
SYM and ASYM outcomes. At least, we do not expect to obtain the same results
as in ASYM, as a 50% fine reduction is offered to the first reporting player and
thereby gives an incentive to report.
With a total of 12 observations we find that average market prices are not signif-
icantly different from SYM (two-sided MWU test, p = 0.396). Surprisingly, cartel
formation is even lower than in SYM (one-sided MWU test, p = 0.014). This result
may be driven by the reluctance of cartel ringleaders to discuss prices. As they
realize negative per-period earnings even upon reporting, not participating in talks
seems to be the better option as 0.33¯ > 0. Then again, if there were enough trust
among the group, cartelization would be the best option, but subjects undercut
prices most often in this treatment. In 75% of all cartel groups, the agreed-upon
price is not identical with the market price. For further details on pricing behavior
in ASYM50, we refer to Figure A.2 in Appendix A.1 on page 95. In ASYM50, 75%
of all cartels are reported, while 7.1% are detected by the authority. That is every
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second cartel which was not reported.
With market prices in ASYM50 being equally low and cartel formation being
even lower than in SYM, one could argue in favor of the current practice of the
European Commission. The EU implemented a non-discriminatory leniency policy
in 2002, making cartel ringleaders eligible for leniency application and thereby
raising distrust among cartelists. However, ringleaders have not yet been granted
full immunity upon reporting, but they have been granted fine reductions of up to
50%. The results of our experiment show that even a fine reduction of only 50%
has the same tendency as immunity from fines. Market prices and cartel formation
are significantly lower than in ASYM (one-sided MWU test, p < 0.01).
2.6 Conclusion
In this essay, we analyze the impact of the different treatment of cartel ringleaders.
In an economic experiment, subjects are given the possibility to report a cartel
before an investigation takes place. In case of a report, the player is granted a
fine reduction of up to 100%. In a symmetric treatment (SYM), all players may
report the conspiracy, whereas the cartel ringleader is not allowed to report in the
asymmetric treatment (ASYM). Despite the non-binding nature of price discus-
sions, groups that do communicate are able to realize higher market prices than
groups that do not discuss prices. This result is in line with similar experimental
studies on cartelization. The focus of the experiment in this contribution lies on
the effects of ringleader discrimination (exclusion from leniency programs). Our re-
sults suggest that antitrust policy should be designed for making cartel ringleaders
eligible for leniency application. We find a strong deterrence effect as, compared to
ASYM, cartel formation is significantly lower in non-discriminatory designs (SYM).
Likewise, resulting market prices are significantly lower because cartelists cheat on
each other more often. Compared to the ASYM Treatment, we also find a higher
fraction of reports in SYM. When every player has the possibility to report the
conspiracy, the cartel ringleader is no longer a trustworthy partner in crime as he
has similar rights to anyone else. This strengthens the distrust among cartelists
and vitalizes the race to report. We also provide evidence from a treatment where
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we implement a high probability of detection through an authority (ASYMhigh).
The treatment yields about the same results as SYM. We do not find significant
differences in either cartel formation or resulting average market prices. Subjects
exhibit similar behavior regarding deviation and reporting. As an overall conclusion
we argue in support of a non-discriminatory leniency policy. However, granting full
immunity to cartel ringleaders might be hard to justify, as the driving force of the
conspiracy then remains virtually unpunished. Since the results in ASYM50 show
a similar effect as in SYM, a fine reduction upon reporting seems to be sufficient.
This more desirable approach corresponds to the leniency program by the German
Federal Cartel Office and is in line with the current leniency practice of the Eu-
ropean Commission as to date, no ringleader has yet been granted full immunity
from fines.
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3 Regulatory Price Interventions in
Retail Gasoline Markets: An
Experimental Analysis of the
Austrian Rule
3.1 Introduction
Since the Bundeskartellamt (BKartA, German Federal Cartel Office, henceforth
FCO) took up a sector inquiry in the market for gasoline in May 2008, this specific
market increasingly draws competition experts’ attention. With the goal to analyze
the proper functioning of the retail gasoline market in Germany, the FCO thereby
finds a dominant position of five companies (Aral (BP), Shell, Jet (Conoco Philips),
Esso (Exxon Mobil) and Total). As market entry is virtually impossible, no other
player is able to effectively constrain the market power of the above-mentioned
oligopoly. Furthermore, the market is characterized by a high level of transparency:
every competitor has knowledge about all market prices at any given time and is
also able to estimate production costs and sales prices of the other oligopolists.
According to the FCO, the observed market behavior of price parallelism in the
gasoline retail market is caused by this market structure. Evidence for explicit
collusion, however, was not found.
In the final report, published in May 2011, the FCO attests the market an
anticompetitive environment. Moreover, it discusses price-regulatory mechanisms
which are current practice in neighboring countries and in Western Australia. How-
ever, the FCO remains skeptical about the effectiveness of the Austrian, the Lux-
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embourgish and the Western Australian price regulation rules in Germany. Like-
wise, the point of view of numerous competition experts who attended the 2011
Conference on Antitrust Law in Bonn was skeptical, too. Furthermore, the asso-
ciated working paper (Bundeskartellamt, 2011a) specifically mentions the “risk of
worsening (instead of improving or solving) the situation if a potentially incorrect
regulatory rule was implemented". Nevertheless, especially the Austrian rule at-
tracted attention and was the subject of a vivid, yet constructive discussion at the
conference. Since the majority of the participants was not convinced about the
utility and the applicability of the Austrian rule, competition experts encouraged
to further research the effectiveness of price-regulatory interventions by means of
economic experimentation (see Bundeskartellamt (2011c)).
Basically, the Austrian rule dictates the timing of price increases. Gasoline sta-
tion operators are only allowed to increase prices once a day at 12 pm (noon). Price
reductions, however, are permitted at any time of the day. Thus, the rule restrains
from setting prices at will and aims to counter price volatility. At first glance,
such price-regulatory intervention seems attractive and consumer-friendly: As the
rule is simple to comprehend, it creates transparency and certainty. However, the
same goes for gasoline retailers and oil companies. The intended consumer advan-
tage might therefore result in a consumer disadvantage. The rule regulates pricing
behavior and reduces the suppliers’ choice of actions. Thereby, pricing behavior
becomes more predictable and, for retailers and oil companies, uncertainty about
competitor’s pricing decreases. This scenario provides ideal conditions facilitating
price coordination and collusion.
For these reasons, we are also skeptical about the beneficial character of a price
regulatory intervention along the lines of the Austrian rule. We therefore model
interaction (constraints) under the Austrian rule and analyze pricing behavior in
an economic experiment. We investigate the functioning of the mechanism and
evaluate its suitability as a price-regulatory scheme in retail gasoline markets. As a
result, we find the Austrian rule to support coordination and, thereby, to facilitate
collusion in an experimental market with infinitely repeated interaction. More-
over, the regulated experimental market yields less volatile but significantly higher
market prices compared to our unregulated experimental market.
In the following section, we start off by presenting a detailed print media cover-
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age to shed some light on the political discussion about the implementation of a
regulatory mechanism in the sense of the Austrian rule. We then introduce further
price-regulatory schemes which are established law in neighboring countries and
Western Australia in section 3.2. The related literature is reviewed in section 3.3.
After introducing the experiment in section 3.4, we present our hypothesis in sec-
tion 3.5. We describe the experimental procedure in section 3.6 before we evaluate
all hypotheses by discussing the results in section 3.7. A summary of all findings is
presented in section 3.8.
3.2 Industrial and political background on gasoline
market price regulation
By covering print media from August 2009 until April 2012, we give a detailed
understanding of the point of view of various policymakers and industry insid-
ers in Austria and Germany. Furthermore, we introduce and discuss other price-
regulatory mechanisms in this context.
We first show the continuous increase in gasoline prices in Germany. Because min-
eral oil companies are found to collude tacitly (see Bundeskartellamt (2011b)), com-
petition authorities are not able to initiate appropriate legal proceedings. Therefore,
the FCO merely pays focused attention to improve competition by strengthening
independent gasoline stations. As prices increase further, politicians are called
upon to rectify the situation. By evaluating different approaches, German politi-
cians take into account various price regulation schemes which are established law
in neighboring European countries and in Western Australia (see Die Welt (2012b)
or Süddeutsche Zeitung (2012a) besides countless other newspaper articles). We
discuss the Austrian rule in subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the Luxembourgish gasoline
price ceiling in 3.2.3 and the 24 hour rule (Western Australia) in subsection 3.2.4.
3.2.1 The Austrian rule in Austria
The Austrian rule, as introduced above and established law today, is the result
of a number of legislations that were adopted in Austria over the past years. In
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order to increase transparency and to counter highly volatile gasoline prices, the
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend (BMWFJ, Federal Min-
istry of Economy, Family and Youth, henceforth FMEFY) introduced a regulation
scheme which allows for price increases to take place once a day only. The Gas
Price Regulation Act came into effect on July 1, 2009 (see BMWFJ (2009)). From
then on, an increase in gas prices was only possible at 12 am (midnight) or upon
opening of the gas station in the morning. Price reductions, however, were permit-
ted at any time of the day. On the one hand, consumers quickly adapted to the
new circumstances. According to an online-survey conducted by the Österreichis-
cher Automobil-, Motorrad- und Touring-Club (ÖAMTC, Austrian Automobile,
Motorcycle and Touring Association, henceforth AAMTA) one month after the
price regulation came into effect, 60% of all consumers who took part in the survey
changed their demand for gasoline: 21% of the participants no longer refuel during
the day, when prices are comparatively high, but in the evening, when prices tend to
be lower. Apparently with good reason, as the AAMTA observes price reductions
at 10 am, 1 pm and 4 pm. However, already in August 2009, the AAMTA took the
line, that prices are systematically set too high in the morning (see DiePresse.com
(2009b)). On the other hand, shortly after the introduction of the 2009 price reg-
ulation, consumers also faced problems that might not have been properly taken
into consideration by the FMEFY. The 2009 regulation, for example, differenti-
ated between (1) gas stations that offer services during the day, (2) those with 24
opening hours and (3) automated gas stations, which can be operated without any
personal all day and night. Each respective type of station could increase gas prices
at (1) the opening of the gas station, (2) midnight and (3) by no later than 8:30
am. BP Austria also recognized the unequal treatment and announced to file an
individual application with the Constitutional Court to repeal the regulation (see
DiePresse.com (2009a)).
As this inconsistency rather increased uncertainty instead of transparency and
fostered confusion among consumers, the regulation was revised. The new regula-
tion scheme, commonly known as the Austrian rule, came into effect on January
1, 2011 (see BMWFJ (2010)). The only difference to the old regulation scheme
was (and is to date) the point of time when prices may be increased. While the
new regulation also only allowed for one price increase per day, the time was set
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to exactly1 12 pm (noon) for all kinds of gas stations. This way, the ministry
followed the request of, inter alia, the AAMTA, who argued in favor of a single
point of time for price increases (see ÖAMTC (2010)). In case of a violation of
either the old or the new regulation, authorities may impose penalties according
to the Gewerbeordnung (GewO, Trade Regulation Act, henceforth TRA) and the
Preisauszeichnungsgesetz (PreisauszeichnungsG, Pricing Act, henceforth PA). See
Table 3.1 for more details and a comparison of the old and new Austrian gasoline
pricing regulation.
Regulation old Regulation new
came into effect July 1, 2009 January 1, 2011
effective until December 31, 2010 December 31, 2013
price increase once at 12 am (midnight) or upon once at 12 pm (noon),
opening of the gas station, consistent for all
automated gas stations kinds of gas stations
by no later than 8.30 am
price reduction at any time at any time
penalty up to EUR 2180 (TRA) and up to EUR 1450 (PA)
Table 3.1: Comparison of the old and new Austrian gasoline pricing regulation
By implementing the revised Gas Price Regulation Act (which from now on,
we solely refer to by the Austrian rule), the FMEFY, or, more precisely, Rein-
hold Mitterlehner (Minister for Economy and Energy) intended to further increase
competition among gas station operators and to further increase transparency for
consumers (see DerStandard.at (2010)). However, the AAMTA did not observe sig-
nificant price reductions in retail gasoline markets. In urban areas, gasoline prices
changed four times a day, two times in rural areas. The strategy still would be a
major increase ("as high as possible") at noon and a step by step reduction during
the day (see ÖAMTC (2011)). Using data from the European Commission’s Oil
bulletin, Dewenter and Heimeshoff (2012) apply an econometric model and do not
1The FMEFY expects an instant change in prices without undue delay. The ministry however
recognizes the various practices at gas stations and further defines instant change as "in ac-
cordance with the technical requirements of labeling", which, according to the FMEFY takes
about 5 to 10 minutes if the process is not automated.
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find conclusive results: Gasoline retail prices may have decreased because of the
Austrian rule, however, the effect is not found to be significant.
In April 2012, after an intense discussion about price-regulatory mechanisms in
Germany (see below) and the evaluation of different schemes, Reinhold Mitterlehner
announces further (possible) regulatory measures to the Austrian press. As for now,
only the timing of price increases is regulated in Austria, Mitterlehner also takes
"price corridors" into consideration (see DerStandard.at (2012)).
3.2.2 The Austrian rule in Germany
Gasoline prices is also a very sensitive topic in Germany. Due to an increase in price
of about 10 Euro-Cent per liter in December 2010 (see Figure 3.1), in January 2011
the Auto Club Europe (ACE, Automobile Club Europe) requested Rainer Brüderle
(Federal Minister for Economy at the time) to bring forth a regulation according
to the Austrian rule in Germany (see Tankstellenmarkt.com (2011a)).
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Figure 3.1: Retail Gasoline prices (with taxes in EUR) in Germany (January 2010
to February 2012), data from Europe’s Energy Portal (2012)
Likewise, the Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil Club (ADAC, General German
Automobile Association, henceforth GGAA) often demanded for governmental in-
tervention with respect to high gasoline prices, however, it did not take position as
to which mechanism ought to be implemented. In May 2011, the FCO published
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the final report on the sector inquiry in the gasoline market in Germany. In the
report, the FCO concludes that gasoline prices are above competitive pricing, but
there is no explicit collusion among mineral oil companies. However, there seems
to be price leadership, as the data shows that one company increases prices while
others systematically and reliably follow on a regular basis. The collusive behavior
is obvious but not within the scope of jurisdiction of the FCO. There is found no
explicit coordination because the companies observe market behavior and adapt
their own strategy, i.e., their pricing. Wernhard Möschel (former chairman of the
German Monopoly Commission) deems this to be normal competitive behavior (see
Die Welt (2011b)). By analyzing the data collected during the sector inquiry, the
FCO finds a pattern that, based on trust and the functioning over time, does not
require for any agreement. Thus, the FCO, too, requests politics to deal with the
problem at hand.
The Federal Minister for Economy, Philipp Rössler (appointed as Minister in
May 2011), immediately argued in favor of the Austrian rule and announced that
"the ministry would test if the mechanism was appropriate" (see Rheinische Post
(2011)). Numerous politicians were backing Rössler’s steps towards the Austrian
rule in summer 2011. Among the supporters at that time was Ilse Aigner (Fed-
eral Minister for Consumer Protection). Both, the Bundeswirtschatsministerium
(BMWi, Federal Ministry for Economy, henceforth FME) and the Bundesminis-
terium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz (BMELV, Federal
Ministry for Consumer Protection) repositioned themselves in November 2011, as
the Austrian rule (apparently) allowed for price increases that are higher than nec-
essary in order to reduce them step by step over the day (see Bundestag (2011) and
Der Westen (2011)). To our best knowledge, the study or the investigation they
base their decision on, is not publicly available. Yet, Berninghaus et al. (2012) were
published online as a working paper.
Needless to say, most syndicates refuse to accept regulatory interventions, even
more so when it comes to a pricing mechanism that resembles the Austrian rule
(see Tankstellenmarkt.com (2011b) for more details and the positioning of each
respective syndicate or institution). In addition to that, Andreas Mundt, president
of the FCO, expressed his doubts as to the effectiveness of the Austrian rule for
the same reasons mentioned above. So did the majority of the competition experts
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who attended the 2011 Conference on Antitrust Law in Bonn (see Bonner General-
Anzeiger (2011) and Bundeskartellamt (2011c)). Likewise, the GGAA was skeptical
about this kind of regulatory intervention. GGAA spokesman Klaus Reindl drew
attention to the structural differences between the Austrian and the German gaso-
line market as he questioned the application of the Austrian rule in Germany (see
Der Westen (2011)).
Just when everyone seemed to agree on not to pursue the Austrian rule as an
appropriate way to reduce gasoline prices in Germany, the state of Thuringia is-
sued an official request within the Federal Council on December 22, 2012 (see
Bundesrat (2011)). The request aimed to bring the government to implement a
price-regulatory mechanism along the lines of the Austrian rule in Germany. As
the issue was not finally decided on at the 892nd meeting of the Federal Coun-
cil on February 10, 2012, the request was forwarded to the expert committees for
further analysis (see Bundesrat (2012c)). Three expert committees were chosen,
namely the Wirtschaftsausschuss (Wi, Economic Committee, henceforth EC), the
Ausschuss für Agrarpolitik und Verbraucherschutz (AV, Committee for Agricultural
Policy and Consumer Protection, henceforth CAPCP) and the Finanzausschuss (Fz,
Financial Committee, henceforth FC). On February 16, 2012, EC and CAPCP rec-
ommended the Federal Council to "implement a price regulatory mechanism along
the lines of the Austrian rule or to further review alternative mechanisms". FC
abstained from giving a recommendation to the Federal Council (see Bundesrat
(2012b)). Michael Boddenberg, Hesse Minister of State, appended his request for
price regulatory intervention at the 895th meeting of the Federal Council on March
30, 2012. He argued in favor of the 24 hour rule (Western Australia) to be imple-
mented (see Bundesrat (2012d)). On the same day, the Federal Council took into
account the advice given by the expert committees CAPCP and EC, and forwarded
its decision to the Federal Government (see Bundesrat (2012a)).
Meanwhile, in March 2012, Andreas Mundt clarified the opinion of the FCO in
Bonner General-Anzeiger (2012) and Wirtschaftswoche (2012). As companies in
Germany already increased prices (only) once a day, the Austrian rule would, in
his opinion, "not improve the situation much". Instead, Mundt brought up the 24
hour rule, which (to date) is current practice in Western Australia. Yet, he took
the line that there was no price regulatory mechanism in the world which could
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identically be adapted to the German gasoline market (see Der Westen (2012)).
Because of that, Mundt requested for more research to be conducted on possible
regulatory mechanisms which lead to more competition in the market for gasoline.
We introduce further price regulatory mechanisms in the following subsections.
3.2.3 Price ceiling (Luxembourg)
In Luxembourg, the maximum retail price for gasoline is set by the government. The
price consists of the moving average of wholesale gasoline prices (Rotterdam) and a
margin for costs set in negotiation with the Groupement Pétrolier Luxembourgeois
(GPL, Association of Luxembourgish Oil Companies). A regulative mechanism ac-
cording to this model was also discussed in the media with respect to governmental
intervention in Germany (see Rheinische Post (2011) and Die Welt (2011b)).
In their economic survey on Luxembourg, OECD (2010, p. 50) on the one hand
acknowledges that a fixated maximum price may effectively counter monopolistic
pricing. On the other hand, the OECD finds price ceilings to be an imperfect
substitute for effective competition. According to OECD (2010), price ceilings in
Luxembourg possibly represent obstacles to price competition with the imminent
risk of collusive behavior. OECD (2010) even recommends removing price ceilings
for gasoline retailing as soon as the Luxembourgish competition authority has suf-
ficient capacity (there were only four members of staff at the time the study was
published). Sen et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence on retail gasoline price ceil-
ings in Canada and find such regulation to be significantly correlated with higher
prices.
Price ceilings may serve as focal points (see Schelling (1960)). This logic can be
ascribed to the literature of evolutionary game theory where the relevancy of focal
points emerges in games with multiple equilibria (see subsection 3.3.3 for further
details). If there is a given maximum price, it seems only natural for retailers to
make use of this offer. If one player assumes all other players to act in the same way,
the outcome could result in an equilibrium by everyone charging the highest price
possible. The collusive equilibrium might therefore constitute only due to the fact,
that the ceiling price was proposed and communicated by the government or the
authority (see also Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 265-268)). Nevertheless, Lünemann
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and Mathã (2005) note that such price regulation must not per se lessen price
volatility. They argue that gasoline prices in Luxembourg reveal a high frequency
of price change, which is contrary to the point of view in Die Welt (2011b). In
addition, OECD (2010) complements that prices, set by large gasoline retailers, are
as a general rule undercut by independents who account for about one-third of the
market in Luxembourg. A similar logic might hold for pricing behavior under the
Austrian rule. Although no (numerical) ceiling price is set, all market participants
might quickly learn the existence of a certain level of pricing that emerges every
day at 12 pm (noon): for example, the monopoly price. Relating to this concern,
the AAMTA study mentioned above has already shown a major, possibly higher
than necessary or justified, price increase in Austria.
In the style of the government announcing a ceiling price, the industry also
takes advantage of price announcements on its own. In late August 2011, the
German media announced BP/Aral’s strategy to charge higher prices (see Die Welt
(2011a)). Information was made public that Aral intended to internally implement
a compensation model which ties the commission for gasoline station operators to
the duration they charge high retail prices. Thereby, the oil company provides
incentives for retailers to set rather high than low prices. Further, it is beneficial
to retailers to maintain high prices, once they are in place. In practice this has no
effect on consumers as long as there are sufficient gas stations in the area that (1) are
run by other oil companies or (2) are independent. As long as other oil companies
do not follow Aral’s example, setting similar incentives for retailers, these branded
and independent retailers would be likely to provide gasoline cheaper than Aral
retailers. Consumers will, however, face high prices across the whole area if all other
oil companies adopted this approach. The danger of such pricing announcements
has been shown by Andreoli-Versbach (2012) with regard to information exchange
on intended future behavior. On the basis of an empirical analysis, the author
provides evidence for an intense retail price parallelism subsequent to the public
announcement of an individual price policy change by the Italian market leader
Eni.
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3.2.4 24 hour rule (Western Australia)
In late 2000, the Western Australian Government passed the Petroleum Products
Pricing Amendment Act 2000 concerning a number of arrangements relating to
gasoline prices. With the goal to deliver (1) greater competition on wholesale and
retail levels, (2) a more transparent petroleum market, (3) a reduction of volatility
of retail prices and (4) a reduction in the differential between city and country
gasoline prices, one of the arrangements provided by the Act, was the requirement
for retail prices being fixed for a 24 hour period. The arrangement came into effect
on January 2, 2001.
As the legislation did not require retailers to move to the previously announced
price, the government closed this loophole under the Petroleum Products Pricing
Amendment Regulations (No. 2) 2001 from August 24, 2001. From then on,
retailers had to fix prices of all grades of petrol, diesel and liquefied petroleum gas
for each calendar day between 6 am to 6 am. All prices of the following day had to
be announced to the West Australian Department of Consumer and Employment
Protection (DOCEP) until 2 pm of the current day (see ACCC (2008)).
The 24 hour rule has always been a part of the discussion about price-regulatory
mechanisms that could be implemented in Germany. In 2011, Peter Ramsauer
(Federal Minister of Transport) promoted the pricing scheme in the media. Back
then, Justus Haucap (Chairman of the Monopoly Commission and Professor for
economics) spoke out against the realization of the 24 hour rule in Germany. He
expressed his doubts with respect to lower gasoline prices and deduced state aided
cartelization. "As prices had to be changed less often under governmental regu-
lation, one could think of facilitated collusion" (see Die Welt (2011b)). Recently,
Haucap and Müller (2012)) provide evidence on the effectiveness of the 24 hour
rule on the basis of an economic experiment. As a main result of the paper, they
suggest that the regulation implemented in Western Australia at least does, from
a welfare point of view, not harm consumers. However, positive effects on wel-
fare could not be expected either. The analysis by Haucap and Müller (2012) will
further be discussed in section 3.3.2.
Associated with all the discussion, is, however, the understanding that the market
structure of Western Australia might not be applicable to the respective market
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in Germany (or elsewhere). Western Australia is a huge state which accounts for
one-third of the area of the whole continent. With 10% of the national population,
Western Australia has a population density of 0.91 per km2 with the majority of
the population concentrated in the cities at the coastline (Perth, for example). In
2010, the population density in Germany was 220 per km2 (99 per km2 in Austria),
whereas the distribution is rather uniform.
In their final report of the sector inquiry Bundeskartellamt (2011b), the FCO
also picks up the 24 hour rule and refers to documents published by the Australian
Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC). Surprisingly, the authority itself
finds a lessening of competition at both the wholesale and retail levels subsequent to
the introduction of the 24 hour rule. According to ACCC (2002), this results from
the inability of independent gas station operators to quickly respond to competitors.
However, according to ACCC (2008), there apparently is no evidence of an increase
in prices. Moreover, ACCC (2008) even concludes by finding a small overall price
decrease. This result cannot be confirmed by Wang (2009), who assesses the 24
hour rule empirically. See section 3.3.2 for further details on his findings. The
ACCC (2008) analysis is also heavily challenged by Harding (2008b), who deems
the econometrics behind the ACCC (2008) conclusion to be deeply flawed. In his
recent contribution, Harding (2008a) even contradicts some of the results. Notice
the author’s creativity as he refers to the Western Australian "Fuelwatch"-program
by titling his work as responses to the "Foolwatch"-program.
3.2.5 Price transparency and the margin squeeze issue
According to Andreas Mundt in Wirtschaftswoche (2012), "one needs to think
about how to disturb the peace of the gasoline oligopoly". We use this quote as an
opportunity to digress, as we discuss the interaction between market (in)transparency
and facilitated collusion as well as further mechanisms to "disturb the peace" in an
excursus.
As mentioned above, the FCO has brought forth doubts regarding the effective-
ness of the Austrian rule and warned that a rash price regulatory intervention might
also backfire (see Bundeskartellamt (2011a)). A splendid example of a governmen-
tal intervention gone wrong is presented by Albaek et al. (1997). In 1993, in an
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attempt to "[..] promote competition and, thus, strengthen the efficiency of pro-
duction and distribution of goods and services, etc., through the largest possible
transparency of competitive conditions [..]", the Danish antitrust authority decided
to gather data on transaction prices for two grades of ready-mixed concrete for pub-
lication on a regular basis. In the first year subsequent to the initial publication,
average prices of both grades increased by 15 to 20 percent. The authors analyze
the situation by taking into account business upturns and capacity constraints and
suggest the increase in transparency to be the reason for the reduced intensity of
oligopoly price competition.
When it comes to transparency, there is always the question of its effect on com-
petition. Every economic textbook basically suggests markets and prices to be
competitive if there is full transparency about everything. Besides the requirement
for some other assumptions characterizing perfect competition, perfect informa-
tion about prices and product quality are always mentioned (see, e.g., Carlton and
Perloff (1999, p. 57)). The structure of this sort of economic interaction is often un-
derstood to be identically applicable to any market, but reality proves "us" wrong
in more than just one case (or market). Because prices are key strategic variables,
any company monitors the market in order to take into account the strategy which
is currently pursued by one’s competitors. Setting prices below competitor’s prices
requires for exact calculation and therefore knowledge about current market prices,
too. In general, there is nothing wrong about positioning oneself in a "competitive"
market. While some competition experts assess this behavior as thoroughly com-
petitive behavior (Wernhard Möschel, former chairman of the German Monopoly
Commission in Germany, for example, see Die Welt (2011b)), the possibility of ob-
serving current sales prices in highly transparent oligopoly markets poses a problem
for antitrust authorities. This issue is also discussed by the members of the policy
round table in OECD (2001). They suggest that a negative impact of increased
price transparency is especially likely in markets already prone to anticompetitive
coordination.
This logic may easily be adapted to the retail gasoline market in Germany. With
five major companies in place (Aral (BP), Shell, Jet (Conoco Philips), Esso (Exxon
Mobil) and Total), the German Federal Cartel Office finds a highly transparent mar-
ket with concentrated supply by vertically integrated oil companies. Gasoline prices
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in Germany (with taxes) are known to be rather above than below EU average (see
Europe’s Energy Portal (2012)) and consumers regularly suggest cartelization as a
reason for such high retail prices. However, the German antitrust authority did not
find explicit agreements among oil companies. Yet, Andreas Mundt does not with-
hold the admonitory position of the authority in numerous interviews and speeches
(see Bonner General-Anzeiger (2011) and Bonner General-Anzeiger (2012)) as the
investigation (sector inquiry 2008-2011) has revealed implicit price coordination.
Oil companies make use of a behavioral pattern where one company increases sales
prices and all others follow on a regular basis. This coordination, over time, does
not require for any kind of explicit agreement (see Bundeskartellamt (2011b)).
Because Philipp Rössler (FME) and Andreas Mundt (FCO) reject both, the
Austrian rule and the Western Australian 24 hour rule (see Augsburger Allgemeine
(2012)), they focus the effort of the competition authority to promote competition
by strengthening independent gasoline stations, which (in terms of quantity) ac-
count for one-third of the gasoline retail market (see Frankfurter Rundschau (2012)
and Süddeutsche Zeitung (2012a)). It has come to the FCO’s attention that all,
or at least some, of the five major (highly vertically integrated) oil companies
might discriminate against independent gasoline stations. The authority accuses
the oligopolists to charge higher wholesale gasoline prices to independent gasoline
station operators than they charge their own (branded) gasoline station operators.
This so called margin squeeze is prohibited according to Article 20 section 4.3 of the
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB, Act Against Restraints of Com-
petition, henceforth ARC). The German government recognizes the effectiveness of
this tool to fight discrimination by law, as legislature intends to adopt Article 20
section 4 ARC for an indefinite period of time. At the moment, its legal force is
meant to end on December 31, 2012.
As numerous complaints were filed with the FCO, in early April 2012, the author-
ity mailed detailed questionnaires to all major oil companies, demanding to explain
and (if necessary to) justify their apparent illegal behavior. While some recipients
declare to already have implemented surveillance mechanisms, all of them criticize
the questionnaires after having already been investigated in the sector inquiry for
over three years (see Süddeutsche Zeitung (2012b), Süddeutsche Zeitung (2012c) or
Die Welt (2012a)). According to Handelsblatt (2012a), Norbert Röttgen, Federal
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Environment Minister at that time, supports the intervention of the FCO as he
describes the behavior of major oil companies as "an unacceptable and shameless
abuse of power". However and despite all efforts, Süddeutsche Zeitung (2012b)
expects a further increase in prices, since the margin squeeze approach does not
affect high price transparency of the retail gasoline market.
3.3 Related literature
There is virtually no contribution which exclusively deals with the Austrian rule.
We therefore study the literature that is closely related to gasoline markets (3.3.1)
and price regulatory mechanisms in general (3.3.2). We append a brief insight into
equilibrium selection with respect to the aforementioned focal point theory (3.3.3).
3.3.1 Gasoline markets
While various studies empirically analyze the speed of adjustment of retail prices to
upstream prices (wholesale, crude oil prices) to determine whether increases in sales
prices are due to market power and collusive behavior (see Borenstein and Shepard
(2002) or Deltas (2008) and Kirchgässner and Kübler (1992) for an analysis of the
German gasoline market), there are also experimental studies on gasoline markets.
In one of them, Deck and Wilson (2008) investigate the competitive effects of "zone
pricing" on consumers in a vertical model of gasoline markets. They find that prices
in smaller and isolated regions are higher than in regions where there are more gas
stations. They further analyze vertical interaction between refiners and retailers
as, based on their data they suggest, that under uniform wholesale pricing by
refiners, retailers extract surplus from the consumers by differentiating retail prices
regionally (isolated and center area). Wilson (2007) discusses the advantages of
experimental economics to research antitrust and policy issues as he explains the
procedure of the above mentioned gasoline market experiment conducted by Deck
and Wilson (2008).
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3.3.2 Price-regulatory mechanisms
Ever since the media brought attention to the doubtful effectiveness of the Austrian
rule, the study by Berninghaus et al. (2012) is the first contribution which analyses
the Austrian rule by means of an economic experiment. We will not review the
contribution at this point, as we discuss all results presented in Berninghaus et al.
(2012) in section 3.7. In addition, we then have a closer look at the data and report
further results.
In order to analyze the effects of all previously discussed price-regulatory mech-
anisms, Haucap and Müller (2012) build on the model by Deck and Wilson (2008)
in their recently conducted economic experiment. Haucap and Müller (2012) use
a quadratic (10×10)-Hotelling-city with for sellers (gasoline stations) and 10.000
uniformly distributed robot buyers. As they divide one period into four rounds
(morning, noon, afternoon, night), they additionally model demand fluctuations.
Under every regulatory mechanism (Baseline (free competition), Austria, Luxem-
bourg, Western Australia), sellers set prices while also taking into account wholesale
prices. Wholesale prices are communicated to be random, but a given price path is
implemented in the experiment. Using a within-subject design, Haucap and Müller
(2012) implement each two regulatory schemes in any of their treatments. They
find the Austrian as well as the Luxembourgish approach to have a negative effect
on consumer welfare that comes along with higher retail prices as in the Baseline
setting. As a main result, the authors argue in favor of the Western Australian
mechanism, as this regulation, based on their experimental data, at least does not
seem to harm consumers.
In contrast to the simple experiment by Berninghaus et al. (2012) allowing for
clear-cut results and testing the behavioral features that come along with a regula-
tory price intervention in the sense of the Austrian rule, the experiment by Haucap
and Müller (2012) is more of exploratory nature: Because of a whole bunch of
potentially influencing variables, there is less control. Participants decisions can-
not exclusively be traced back to the price-setting rule. For example, Haucap and
Müller (2012) recognize demand fluctuation. This is well-meant, but it is not con-
trolled for the effect of this variation. In addition, it is inaccurately implemented:
The authors allow for price increases in the first period of their experiment, when
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demand is high. This is not in line with the Austrian rule where an increase in
price has to take place at 12 pm (noon), when, according to the authors’ model,
demand is relatively low. Haucap and Müller (2012) find a strong initial increase
in prices under the Austrian rule while it is absolutely unclear if this effect can be
attributed to the high demand in that first period (which would be self-explanatory,
as the level of demand is communicated to all subjects) or the possibility of a sole
increase, after all. The interpretation of the results would be more precise under
the assumption of constant demand. Moreover, the authors are aware of the ut-
most importance of independent gasoline stations in Müller (2012), yet, they do
not recognize this key market feature in their experimental analysis.
Dewenter and Heimeshoff (2012) apply difference-in-differences methods in order
to analyze the impact of price-regulatory mechanisms on retail prices in Austria
and Western Australia. For studying the Austrian rule, they use data for all 25
European countries. The Austrian rule is found to have a negative impact on
gasoline and diesel prices. The effect is statistically significant. For examining
the 24 hour rule in Western Australia, information on 107 Australian areas and
cities are used. No statistically significant effect is found. Hence, the Austrian rule
outperforms the Western Australian 24 hour rule. However, both the Austrian and
the Western Australian estimation suffer from serial correlation. Therefore, the
significance level may be smaller than estimated, resulting in insignificant effects in
Austria, too.
Hilgers (2012) reviews the process of implementing a price-regulatory mechanism
in Germany as he discusses (gasoline) price transparency and the margin squeeze
issue in the light of the 8th Amendment to the ARC (8. GWB-Novelle). The
author reports the German government’s rejection of the Austrian rule and de-
scribes the FCO’s position in favor of extending the margin squeeze prohibition for
an indefinite period of time. Hilgers (2012) suggests to stronger rely on the Bun-
desnetzagentur’s (BNetzA, Federal Network Agency) expertise regarding regulatory
measures in other markets.
Wanting to introduce further literature related to the 24 hour rule, we realize
that there is as much economic literature on advance, non-binding price announce-
ments (see Holt and Scheffman (1987), Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) and Blair
and Romano (2001) for example) as there is a lack of literature on (simultaneous)
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binding price announcements. There is one experimental study by Grether and
Plott (1984). The authors analyze behavioral aspects that might emerge in mar-
kets characterized by the structural features of the lead-based antiknock compound
industry (Ethyl Case2). One of the three practices challenged by the Federal Trade
Commission was, that suppliers agreed to give at least a thirty-day notice of price
increases. The binding announcements were either communicated to the buyers
directly or made public in print media. The results of the experiment suggest that
only a combination of (1) the specific market structure and (2) facilitating practices
might account for prices and profits above the competitive equilibrium. However,
in neither the real, nor the experimental market did suppliers make their binding
announcements simultaneously. Other firms (in the real market) had "several days
to respond". Hence, we do not deem this study crucially relevant to our context of
the 24 hour rule as the simultaneity is missing.
Wang (2009) uses a rich data set that tracks price changes of nearly every gaso-
line station in the Perth area. He is, thereby, able to analyze pricing strategies
before and after the implementation of the 24 hour rule in Western Australia. He
finds strong evidence for a pricing behavior which is characterized by the Edge-
worth price cycle equilibrium (see Maskin and Tirole (1988)) before and after the
implementation of the 24 hour rule. This concept, which is also applicable to the
German gasoline retail market (see (Bundeskartellamt, 2011c)), describes a pricing
pattern that features short run price commitments. Wang (2009) partly confirms
the findings of ACCC (2008), who also observes cyclical pricing behavior. Yet,
Wang (2009) does not find any significant influence of the 24 hour rule on the level
of retail gasoline prices.
3.3.3 Price ceilings as focal points
As already mentioned in subsection 3.2.3, we are concerned about the evolution of
a focal point that, under a price-regulatory scheme in the fashion of the Austrian
rule, might consolidate prices which remain on a higher level than in unregulated
markets. Such situations emerge when individuals coordinate their behavior by
2Ethyl Corporation, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, PPG Corporation and Nalco
Chemical Corporation, Docket no. 9128. Federal Trade Commission.
46
3 Regulatory Price Interventions in Retail Gasoline Markets
referring to a practice or embarking on a strategy that is particularly striking or
salient. This theory of focal points originates from Schelling (1960). In such sit-
uations, preferring a efficient equilibrium (everyone charges high prices) over a
risk-dominant equilibrium (everyone charges competitive prices) would be in line
with the axiomatic theory of equilibrium selection by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
Sen et al. (2011) suggest this notion to be applicable for price ceilings in gasoline
markets, while the theoretical and experimental literature does not find proof for
the focal point hypothesis. The results of two seminal contributions by Isaac and
Plott (1981) and Smith and Williams (1981) on collusion in double-auctions do
not suggest higher prices due to price ceilings, quite the contrary. Engelmann and
Müller (2010) report on more laboratory experiments which have failed to find a
collusive focal point effect of price ceilings. The authors take the line that previous
studies have made such collusive effects rather difficult. However, in their newly
designed experiment, which even increases the likelihood of a focal-point effect, the
results again fail to provide supportive evidence. When it comes to empirical stud-
ies, there are more analyses besides Sen et al. (2011) which confirm price ceilings
as focal points. Knittel and Stango (2003), for example, use data on (regional)
state-level price ceilings on credit card charges to investigate the effect. Their re-
sults suggest that credit card companies made use of price ceilings as focal points
in order to collude tacitly and thereby to sustain higher prices.
3.4 The experiment
3.4.1 Game design
In order to analyze the behavioral features along the lines of the Austrian rule, we
design an experiment with a simple model of Bertrand competition: a symmetric
duopoly with two homogeneous firms, A and B. Firms compete in prices p ∈ P , with
P = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Assume both firms to choose their prices simultaneously without
the possibility of communication. Ranking the corresponding payoffs correctly, we
obtain an extended version of the classic textbook prisoner’s dilemma (PD), where
each firm has an incentive to always defect if the game is played once (t = 1
round) or finitely often (t rounds with t ∈ {1, ..., T}). As firms reason backwards in
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time and thereby determine their sequence of optimal actions, (1,1) is the unique
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. We introduce a 4 × 4 matrix in the sense of an
extended PD game in Table 3.2.
firm B
number 4 3 2 1
fir
m
A
4 28|28 15|30 10|34 5 |38
3 30|15 22|22 16|27 10|30
2 34|10 27|16 20|20 13|22
1 38| 5 30|10 22|13 14|14
Table 3.2: 4×4 payoff matrix
The asymmetric payoffs of the symmetric game originate from the assumption,
that the firm which sets a comparatively lower price attracts more demand and
therefore earns more. However, the demand is still assumed to be positive, for
example, because of transportation costs.
In an infinitely repeated game (t → ∞ rounds), multiple equilibria emerge. As
long as the corresponding payoffs are not lower than the one-shot equilibrium, every
price combination might result as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Our 4×4
game even allows for more strategic interaction than a 2×2 PD game does. In case
one firm (firm A) were to defect from the collusive equilibrium (4,4) or (3,3) by
setting a price ptA = p
t−1
A − 1, the other firm (firm B) still has the possibility to
punish by deviating even further (pt+1B = p
t
B− 2). Since the FCO finds the German
retail gasoline market to be highly transparent (see Bundeskartellamt (2011b)),
we adopt this market characteristic as we append the payoff Table 3.2 to every
experimental instruction (see Appendix B.2.1).
3.4.2 Treatments
We ran a computerized experiment and implemented four treatments to (1) test
our hypothesis and to (2) thereby analyze behavioral aspects with regard to a
regulatory price intervention following the Austrian rule. Subjects play the game
by two and independently choose a price p ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. They each receive payoffs
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according to Table 3.2 in ECU (experimental currency unit). Subjects play the
game repeatedly for at least 31 rounds: round 0, 1, ..., 30 and so on. In the first
round, round 0, the decision is made automatically. The price p = 3 is chosen for
all subjects. Thus, they start off with a lump sum payment of 22 ECU each and a
history of the game is generated before the first personal decisions take place. After
the 30th decision made by each subject, the session ends with a probability of 1/5,
or another round starts. This way, the end of the repeated game is unknown. We
introduce this termination rule to avoid possible endgame effects (see Selten and
Stoecker (1986) as well as Normann and Wallace (2012)). In our case, the likelihood
of a continuation (δ = (1 − 1
5
) ≈ 0.833) can be considered as the discount factor
of the game. δ ≈ 0.833 is sufficiently high to allow all aforementioned equilibria
to emerge in an infinitely repeated game. For each subject, earnings per round are
accumulated and visible during the whole session. As for the results in section 3.7,
we only illustrate the first 31 rounds.
We first distinguish two treatments in a way, that in one setting, prices can be
chosen freely, i.e. the choice of action of both subjects is not limited. We call this
treatment NREG, as subject behavior or the game itself is "not regulated". In
the second treatment, the choice of actions may be limited or the game might be
understood as "regulated", hence the name REG. Like in NREG, the price p = 3
is chosen automatically in round 0. From then on, in round t, subjects are only
allowed to choose the price that was chosen in round t−1, or any price below. The
full price range is freely selectable in rounds 5, 20, 35 and so on. Only in these
rounds subjects are able to increase prices. A price reduction on the other hand is
possible in every round.
In the treatment REG(FI), subjects play the regulated game repeatedly (as in-
troduced above) but not infinitely. We restrict the duration of the interaction to
31 rounds, which accounts for 30 decisions made by each subject. In REG(FI),
besides the finite timeframe, the choice of actions is limited in the same way as it
is in the REG treatment.
We deem both treatments with an infinite time horizon (REG and NREG) to
be more fitting with respect to retail gasoline markets. No oil company conveys
the impression to leave the market or to go out of business any time soon. Even if
companies took into account the limitation of the resource (fossil) oil, their forecast
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period for gasoline retail markets would still be way shorter: by implication, they
expect to sell gasoline for a rather long time than to end business soon. Never-
theless, for reasons of completeness, we additionally implement a finitely repeated
NREG-Treatment, called NREG(FI). The classification of all treatments can also
be understood from Table 3.3.
Choice of Action
Limited Unlimited
Duration Ininite REG NREGof the
game Finite REG(FI) NREG(FI)
Table 3.3: Classification of treatments
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree application
developed by Fischbacher (2007). We used neutrally worded instructions (see Ap-
pendix B.2) to avoid any indication to the gasoline market, the Austrian rule or
the behavioral implications of the game. Hard terms like "regulatory", "limited
actions" or "cooperation" were not used. Even participants were not referred to
as firms, but simply "participants" and prices were merely "numbers". As we im-
plemented a between-subject design, every participant took only part once in the
experiment. She therefore had no knowledge of any other treatment.
3.5 Hypothesis
We base our hypotheses on the theoretical predictions of the 4×4 PD game intro-
duced in subsection 3.4.1. As we deem gasoline markets to rather be long-lasting
or even never-ending, we focus on the infinite horizon Treatments REG and NREG
in Hypotheses H1 to H4. Additionally, we draw inferences from the finite horizon
Treatments REG(FI) and NREG(FI) in H5 and H6.
Due to the symmetry of the game, we expect participants to coordinate to an
equilibrium where they charge the same prices and split overall profits equally.
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Thus, we formulate our first hypothesis:
H1: Both participants in one market are likely to charge the same
prices.
Since we chose a likelihood of a continuation of the experiment (δ ≈ 0.833) which
is higher than each critical discount factor δ of any subgame, the infinite horizon
allows for multiple equilibria to emerge in REG and NREG. Now, even (4,4) may
result as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Keeping in mind Hypothesis H1 and
recognizing efficiency, it seems plausible for participants to rather choose the price
combination (2,2) over (1,1), (3,3) over (2,2) and ultimately the price combination
(4,4) over (3,3). Thus, participants ought to coordinate to the payoff dominant
equilibrium (4,4). At least we expect participants to realize Pareto superiorities
and hypothesize:
H2: Participants choose prices 3 and 4 more often than prices 1 and 2.
As the aforementioned logic holds for both the regulated and the unregulated
market, we do not expect to observe behavioral differences.
H3: Participants in REG behave in the same way as participants in
NREG.
Nevertheless, transparency in a regulated market is higher than in an unregu-
lated market as price increases are only possible in certain rounds. Due to the
restriction of actions, each participant’s behavior is more predictable, which might
facilitate collusive outcomes. As in the unregulated market uncertainty prevails,
we hypothesize:
H4: There is less price variation in REG than in NREG.
The theoretical predictions change drastically if we look at the finitely repeated
games in REG(FI) and NREG(FI). We obtain the only static Nash-Equilibrium
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(1,1) by backwards induction. As in an infinitely repeated game, given our δ, even
the strategy when both players continuously choose p = 4 constitutes a Nash equi-
librium, we hypothesize:
H5: Average prices are higher in an infinitely repeated game than in
a finitely repeated game.
Relating to Hypothesis H2, we formulate our last hypothesis:
H6: Participants choose prices 3 and 4 more often in an infinitely
repeated game than in a finitely repeated game.
3.6 Experimental procedure
In order to test our hypotheses, we gather data from the economic experiment which
we conducted at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology (KIT) in August 2011. A total of 122 students across all fields of
study took part in the experimental sessions. We ran eight sessions which lasted
about 30 to 45 minutes. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Af-
ter welcoming the subjects to the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned
to visually isolated computer terminals. The instructions were read aloud and all
questions were answered privately. Prior to the beginning of the experiment, partic-
ipants were asked to fill in a computerized questionnaire (see Appendix B.2.3) that
checked their proper understanding of the instructions of each respective treatment.
Unlike in REG and NREG, the number of rounds was limited to 31 rounds (30 deci-
sions) in the REG(FI)- an NREG(FI)-Sessions. On average, subjects played 31.875
rounds. Participants’ earnings per round were accumulated and paid anonymously
at the end of each session. Average payments amounted to e 15.96 with a minimum
payment of e 10.52 and a maximum of e 18.49, respectively. All payments include
a e 5 show-up fee.
We ran the experiment with 17 groups in REG, 16 groups in NREG, 15 groups in
REG(FI) and 13 groups in NREG(FI), respectively. Data from one group (2 partic-
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ipants) in the REG(FI)-Treatment are not part of the analysis. As one participant
revealed an unintentional action taken during the session in the post-experimental
questionnaire, we do not recognize the data for our results. This leaves us with
28 participants in the REG(FI) treatment and 14 groups, respectively. We take
groups as independent observations and provide an overview of all treatments and
sessions in Table 3.4, where we highlight the updated information for the REG(FI)-
Treatment in Session 6.
treatment REG NREG REG(FI) NREG(FI)
session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
participants 16 18 16 16 16 14 (12) 12 14
independent observations 8 9 8 8 8 7 (6) 6 7
periods played 33 35 35 32 30 30 30 30
Table 3.4: Session information
3.7 Results
The conclusions which can be drawn from the REG and NREG treatment have
partly been published in Berninghaus et al. (2012). We include these published
results and provide further insights by analyzing the REG(FI) and NREG(FI)
treatments. We present all results based on the data of the first 31 rounds. As
the decision in round 0 is made automatically, we use data from rounds 1 to 30 (or
rounds 5 to 30, if mentioned explicitly) to analyze descriptive and non-parametric
statistics.
3.7.1 Chosen prices and initial price increases
Table 3.5 illustrates the percentage of prices chosen by all participants per treat-
ment. Overall, we find the highest price 4 to be chosen most often in all of our
treatments. The comparatively high percentage of p = 3 in REG and REG(FI) is
due to the automated initial action, as participants were not able to choose prices
above p = 3 for four rounds. Prices 2 and 3 are virtually not chosen in Treatment
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NREG(FI). Average prices per treatment are 3.64, 3.22, 3.04 and 3.61 in Treatment
REG, NREG, REG(FI) and NREG(FI), respectively.
treatment REG NREG REG(FI) NREG(FI)
price 1 6,37 % 20,94 % 24,17 % 12,31 %
price 2 2,45 % 5,52 % 6,67 % 0,77 %
price 3 11,76 % 3,23 % 9,88 % 0,77 %
price 4 79,41 % 70,31 % 59,29 % 86,15 %
Table 3.5: Percentage of prices per treatment
We find highly cooperative results when we look at price combinations chosen
by participants. According to Hypothesis H1, participants are likely to charge the
same prices. In 82.9% of all rounds, participants in NREG succeed to collaborate by
setting the same prices. Participants in NREG(FI) succeed in 92.8% of all rounds.
We even find slightly more cooperation in our regulated experimental markets. In
REG, participates choose the same price in 94.1% of all rounds, so do participants
in 93.8% of all rounds in REG(FI). While the Nash outcome (1,1) is played most
often in REG(FI), collusion with the highest price possible prevails in NREG(FI). In
Table 3.5, this information is divided by treatment. For a more detailed illustration
(e.g. data by group) see Table A.1 in Appendix A.2.
treatment REG NREG REG(FI) NREG(FI)
price combination (1,1) 3,73 % 14,38 % 21,67 % 9,23 %
price combination (2,2) 0,00 % 1,25 % 5,48 % 0,26 %
price combination (3,3) 11,57 % 0,83 % 9,05 % 0,26 %
price combination (4,4) 78,82 % 66,46 % 57,62 % 83,08 %
Table 3.6: Cooperative results per treatment
Participants choose price combinations (3,3) and (4,4) in more than 2/3 of all
rounds in any treatment. Actually, in the REG (which implies the behavioral
features of the Austrian rule), participants cooperate in 91% of all rounds by setting
prices in the upper range. According to Hypothesis 2, participants choose prices
3 and 4 more often than prices 1 and 2. The same goes for our assumption in
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Hypothesis H6, where we expect participants in the infinite game to cooperate in
high prices. Based on our results, we cannot reject Hypotheses H2 and H6 either.
Figure 3.2 illustrates average earnings per round. Since the price combination
(4,4) is chosen predominantly in each treatment (see Table 3.5), it is not surprising
to observe average earnings to manifest above the initial average earning of 22 (price
combination (3,3)) at some point.
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Figure 3.2: Average earnings per round
The situations where subjects’ average earnings are below 22 are on the one
hand the first 4 rounds in both regulated treatments REG and REG(FI) and the
downturn in round 19 in REG(FI). This drop can be explained by the restrictions
of the Austrian pricing rule, which in certain rounds only allows participants to
set the same price as before, or any price below. On the other hand, we find a
strong endgame effect in both finite treatments REG(FI) and NREG(FI), as nearly
all participants switch to the Nash equilibrium outcome (1,1) towards the end of
the game. Thus, the drop in earnings is somewhat self-explanatory. As for the
REG- and REG(FI)-Treatment, we find a sudden and massive increase in earnings
in rounds 5 and 20, which suggests that participants make use of the possibility to
increase prices drastically, when the opportunity occurs. This observation seems
to confirm the assumption of numerous economists, automobile associations and
competition experts who claim, that a regulation according to the Austrian rule
would lead to an unproportional (and maybe unjustified) increase in prices.
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3.7.2 Volatility and level of prices
Separating the illustration in Figure 3.2 by the duration (finite or infinite) of the
treatments and transforming average earnings into price paths, respectively, we
obtain group average prices per round in Figure 3.3a and in Figure 3.3b.
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(b) Finite duration of the session
Figure 3.3: Group average prices per round
According to Hypothesis H3, participants exhibit the same behavior in REG as in
NREG. We evaluate Hypothesis H3 by analyzing group average prices per round.
We unambiguously find a pricing pattern in the regulated experimental markets
REG and REG(FI), no matter the duration of the game. Using a non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test, we compare the distributions of average prices per
round. With regard to the infinite-horizon Treatments, we find significantly higher
prices in REG than in NREG (one-sided MWU test, p = 0.000). The statistically
significant difference still holds when we only use the data from rounds 5 to 30.
Therefore, we reject Hypothesis H3. We obtain opposite results for the finitely
repeated game, where prices in NREG(FI) are significantly higher than in REG(FI)
(one-sided MWU test, p = 0.000).
We take a look at the respective standard deviation σ in Table 3.7 to analyze
price volatility and thereby evaluate Hypotheses H4, according to which we expect
less price variation in REG than in NREG.
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REG NREG REG(FI) NREG(FI)
σ 0.81 1.24 1.27 1.00
Table 3.7: Standard deviations of prices per treatment
As we take into account all chosen prices, we find prices in Treatment REG(FI)
to be most volatile. NREG also exhibits high price volatility with σ = 1.24. Fig-
ures A.3 to A.6 in Appendix A.2 illustrate group average prices per round for all
treatments conducted. If we compare Figures A.4 and A.5, it clearly shows that the
volatility in REG(FI) can simply be attributed to the (extremely) distortive price
drops and increases while still a pricing pattern emerges in every group. A regula-
tion in line with the Austrian rule seems to hinder price decline until shortly before
the next possibility to increase prices. Pricing in NREG, however, is constantly
changing throughout all rounds which is due to the wide range of actions and the
uncertainty about other participants’ actions that comes along. Price volatility in
Treatments REG and NREG(FI) is moderate with σ = 0.81 and σ = 1.00. Notice
that prices are least volatile in the REG-Treatment, which implies the behavioral
features of the Austrian rule in an infinitely repeated game. As we observe strong
price fluctuations in the regulated markets particularly in rounds shortly before an
increase in prices is possible, whereas we observe fluctuations through all rounds in
our unregulated markets, Hypothesis H4 cannot be confirmed.
The results presented in previous paragraphs strikingly show the importance of
the duration of the game. The horizon does matter for our results and plays a
crucial role for the outcome of our experiment: Firstly, average prices per round
in the infinite regulated Treatment (REG) are significantly higher as in the finite
regulated Treatment (REG(FI)) (one-sided MWU test, p = 0.000). This result is
solely due to the introduction of a finite horizon, where participants behave more
cautiously in our regulated experimental market. We may deduce this conclusion
from Figure A.5 on page 98. There is always a certain percentage of participants
who choose the price p = 1 in REG(FI). Secondly, after a massive increase in prices
in the regulated market of the infinite game (Figure A.3), prices in REG on average
remain above the average prices chosen in the infinite unregulated market NREG.
The opposite holds for the game with a finite duration. Here, average prices in the
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unregulated market are always above prices chosen in the regulated market. As
the results from the finite-horizon Treatments might seem somewhat surprising at
first, we address this outcome in the second part of the following subsection.
3.7.3 Endgame effects and (un)certainty
Slightly altering the plot and further splitting up both Figure 3.3a and Figure 3.3b,
we obtain the percentages of chosen prices per round for each of our four treatments
in Figures 3.4a to 3.4d.
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of chosen prices per round
The illustrations clearly show that participants immediately choose higher prices,
as soon as they are given to possibility to do so in a regulated market. Prices then
remain on a high level for a rather long time before decreasing towards the next
possibility to increase prices in round 20. We find a strong endgame effect in
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REG(FI). Likewise, we find a reduction in average prices in REG although the
experiment continues with a probability of 80%. As the experiment lasted longer
than 35 rounds in one REG-session, we are able to provide further evidence by
analyzing subject behavior in rounds 34 and 35. With a total of 8 independent
observations, 72% of all participants chose p = 4 in round 34. So did 89% in round
35, when an increase in prices was possible once again. This result strongly suggests
that this pattern continues to emerge in longer experiments.
As mentioned above, we find average prices in the unregulated market to be
always above average prices in the regulated market when the game is played finitely
(see Figure 3.3b). This result is somewhat surprising, yet, it is not uncommon.
There is a large amount of experimental literature investigating cooperation in
finitely repeated PD games (see Andreoni and Miller (1993), Dal Bó (2005) and
Normann and Wallace (2012)). In an early contribution, Kreps et al. (1982) report
on experimental evidence that (contrary to theoretical predictions) finds subjects to
being able to achieve some measure of cooperation, even if the game has an unique
Nash equilibrium path (defection in each round of a finite 2×2 PD game). Their
conclusion is as simple as it is plausible. Since there is incomplete information about
the types of players, initial cooperation can be consistent with rational behavior.
Adopting a Tit-for-Tat strategy, for example, may result in subjects successfully
playing the collusive outcome for at least some part of the game. This so called
sequential equilibrium reputation hypothesis has been investigated experimentally
by Andreoni and Miller (1993). The authors find subjects to be rather altruistic
as cooperation prevails until the first defection, even if the end of the game nears.
While the price-volatility in the first 15 rounds of our NREG(FI)-Treatment might
be considered as a sequential equilibrium learning process as suggested by Selten
and Stoecker (1986), the results from our finitely repeated treatments appear to be
in line with the findings by Andreoni and Miller (1993).
To finally evaluate Hypothesis H5, we take as independent observations average
market prices over all 30 rounds per group. According to Hypothesis H5, average
prices are higher in an infinitely repeated game than in a finitely repeated game.
Having a closer look at the cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of prices in
Figure 3.5 partly confirms this assessment.
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative distribution function of prices
The cdf of prices in REG holds first-order stochastic dominance over the cdf of
prices in REG(FI) (one-sided MWU test, p = 0.0115). This result appends to the
analysis of average prices per round in subsection 3.7.2. We find them to be higher
in REG with a p-value of 0.000 (one-sided MWU test). Thus, we cannot reject
Hypothesis H5. However, we do not find statistically significant results comparing
NREG and NREG(FI) as we obtain a p-value of 0.361 (one-sided MWU test).
3.8 Conclusion
The skepticism of numerous governmental organizations and competition experts
towards the implementation of a price regulatory intervention along the lines of
the Austrian rule in Germany seems to be justified. Based on the results of our
experiment, the Austrian rule tends to facilitate collusion as we find significantly
higher prices in the regulated market (REG) compared to prices in the unregulated
market (NREG). The absence of regulation appears to make collusion compara-
tively difficult. The variety of prices chosen (see Figure A.4 on page 97) suggests
the insecurity of each subject, based on the uncertainty about the opponent’s strat-
egy. Analogous, the regulated market yields less volatile prices. This observation
can be attributed to the increased level of transparency that comes along with the
price-regulatory mechanism. By regulating the market and thereby once allowing
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an increase in prices at a specific time, the strategy of any player is more predictable
as the choice of action is restricted in the majority of all rounds.
We additionally provide results from two finite horizon treatments. Contrary to
the theoretical prediction, we find highly cooperative outcomes in the unregulated
market. This result is likely to be driven by the sequential equilibrium reputation
hypothesis. Like in REG, we find a massive increase in prices as soon as the
opportunity arises in REG(FI). No matter the time horizon, the level of prices
is then successfully kept upright until a sudden decrease shortly before the next
possibility to increase prices again.
In the view of these facts, we expect a price-regulatory mechanism in the sense
of the Austrian rule to be associated with a reduction of welfare: prices appear
to be higher. Thus, the intervention would be counterproductive if maximizing
welfare was the aim of the regulation. On the other hand, one might confirm its
functionality if a reduction of price changes was intended. Then, the loss in welfare
would stand for the costs of bringing forth less volatile prices. One would need to
judge whether the utility gained from the implementation outweighs its costs, or
not.
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4 Ambiguity, Induced by
Strategically Investigating
Authorities
4.1 Introduction
The economic literature on law enforcement provides important insights into how
rules need to be established to effectively work against offenders. By threatening
potential criminals with penalties, a norm is set up, signalizing, that infringements
are not tolerated and will be punished. This general deterrence is the most basic
tool for any authority. Yet, misbehavior is still prevalent. One among other reasons
is that offenders do not think they are going to get caught. For them, there is a
trade-off between gains for offending and fines weighted with the probability of
detection.
Regarding the question whether to commit a crime or to engage in any kind of
illegitimate activity has always been subject to the risk of getting caught. Since the
analysis of Becker (1968) on optimal law enforcement, numerous subsequent models
provide a solid theoretical basis on the trade-off between probability and severity
of punishment (see Posner (1985) for an overview of the related literature on law
enforcement). However, most seminal theoretical models use a fixed probability for
authorities to detect misbehavior (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Ehrlich, 1973; Polinsky
and Shavell, 1979).
Lately, an increasing number of contributions focus on specific areas of crime
using endogenous detection probabilities. In those models, the probability of de-
tection depends on the proportion of corrupt officials (Lui, 1986), the level of agreed
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upon cartel prices (Harrington, 2008) or the amount of reported income (Allingham
and Sandmo, 1972; Sandmo, 2005).
To further analyze decision-making regarding misbehavior and deterrence in legal
settings, experimental methods of investigation have become increasingly popular.
For example, experimental evidence on corruption is provided by Abbink et al.
(2002). They find a significant decrease in corruption due to the threat of penalties.
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) analyze the effect of fines, leniency and rewards
on cartel formation and market prices in a Bertrand pricing game. With a focus on
taxes, Anderhub et al. (2001) observe that higher income encourages evasion while
higher tax rates do not. Those studies have one thing in common: All of them
apply a computerized mechanism with a constant probability of being detected to
represent an authority institution. Yet, very recent experiments on tax evasion
endogenize detection probabilities. Coricelli et al. (2010) make the probability of
an audit depend on the median income report of the group. In the tax experiment
conducted by Kleven et al. (2010), the probability of detection is a decreasing
function of reported income. However, none of them have an explicit role for an
authority in the experiment.
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Haan et al. (2009) give rise to the question
whether authority institutions are represented appropriately in economic experi-
ments. They suggest to model the role of an authority separately and to endog-
enize detection probabilities in experiments. We support this view as in practice
authorities do not decide to start investigations by an exogenously given probabil-
ity. Instead, they base their decisions on experience and history as caught offenders
for example are monitored more thoroughly in the future and some industries (or
individuals) are perceived to be more likely to engage in illegitimate activity than
others. Simply put, authorities act strategically.
With fines and gains either being known or expected, the probability of detec-
tion is always perceived individually. The presence of and the general awareness
about an authority actively monitoring the environment are two relevant factors of
influence. Therefore, we will investigate decision-making with regard to the degree
of uncertainty in the presence of an authority being able to act strategically. By
endogenizing the probability of detection, we influence the perceived probability of
detection and observe a significant decrease in the prevalence of misbehavior.
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Cognitive psychology suggests several heuristics and biases (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1974) when judging the likelihood of uncertain outcomes. A perceived prob-
ability can therefore differ largely from a given objective probability. Kahneman
(1972) introduces the representativeness heuristic. With judgment by represen-
tativeness, the decision maker’s perceived probability is influenced by the degree
of correspondence between occurrence and the generic feature of the underlying
process.
According to the distinction of Knight (1921), decision makers in risky situations
know an objective probability for every possible outcome. Under uncertainty, de-
cision makers cannot assign any numerical probabilities. Following the ambiguity
concept by Ellsberg (1961), decisions depended on (1) a perceived probability and
on (2) the vagueness of the event in question. In other words, people rely their
judgment on the reliability, credibility, or adequacy of the information they have
(Ellsberg, 1961). Hence, „ambiguity is uncertainty about probability, created by
missing information that is relevant and could be known.“(Frisch and Jonathan,
1988). An analogous definition is provided by Eichberger and Kelsey (2009):„[..]
where some or all of the relevant information about probabilities is missing“. Am-
biguous situations are therefore neither characterized by risk nor by complete un-
certainty.
Tversky and Wakker (1995) affiliate decision-making not only with the degree of
uncertainty, but also with the source of uncertainty. Empirical and experimental
evidence for this claim is provided by Abdellaoui et al. (2011) as they take into
account different sources of uncertainty in an Ellsberg-like urn experiment. Chang-
ing the source of uncertainty can create some kind of ambiguity if a decision maker
does only have limited knowledge about the process that generates the outcome
(Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985). This makes the concept similar to the application
of the representativeness heuristic by Kahneman (1972), where people judge the
probability or frequency of an event by the characteristics of the process by which
it was generated.
By implementing an authority with strategic selection by human choice instead
of random selection, the situation any decision maker faces is no longer only risky.
All decision makers are required to judge under ambiguity. In contrast to random
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detection, the intended strategy, the decision-making process, of a human authority
is unknown to all other players and probabilities are hard to determine. Although
given the same objective probability of being selected in both cases (e.g. one out
of X decision makers will be investigated, only the mechanism differs), this new
situation is neither subject to risk, nor to complete uncertainty. Hau et al. (2010)
recognize the influence on risky choices and differ between (1) a priori probabilities
and (2) statistical probabilities. While numerical values are known in (1), proba-
bilities cannot be calculated exactly in (2). Yet, they can be assessed empirically.
This creates the ambiguous situation.
Considering these arguments, we investigate decision-making with an authority
being present in an economic experiment and analyze behavioral differences be-
tween random selection and selection by direct choice. Despite of the diversity of
all offenses mentioned above, we will abstain from focusing on a specific area of
crime. Ehrlich (1973) describes the essential common properties of participation
in illegitimate behavior as an increase of the offender’s wealth, the psychic well-
being, or both. Detection on the other hand results in a severe reduction of these
attributes. This basic view of misbehavior will be kept throughout this chapter.
Due to the risk of detection, participation in illegitimate behavior requires decision-
making under uncertainty. Since we only focus on the native risk of getting caught,
we abstain from external effects to third parties, leniency-programs of any kind,
the possibility of whistleblowing and administrative or transaction costs for either
offenders or authorities.
As a result we find that the presence of a strategically acting authority positively
affects deterrence and due to the increase of the degree of uncertainty decreases the
prevalence of misbehavior significantly.
4.2 Game design
In this section we first describe the stages of our game. We then calculate formal
predictions concerning possible outcomes of the game before we have a closer look
at the influence of strategy profiles on the probability of successful detection p.
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4.2.1 Stages of the game
The following stages represent the respective steps for one of n = |I| decision makers
or an authority during one period in our repeated game.
Alternative A Alternative B
(1) Decision makers´ temporary payoff 600 1000
(2) Authority conducts an investigation Yes No Yes No
(2.1) Probability of successful detection p - p -
(3) Decision makers´ payoff 600 600 0 1000
(3.1) Authority´s payoff 0 0 1000 0
Table 4.1: Stages of the game
Stage 1 (decision maker): Each decision maker chooses between a certain al-
ternative (Alternative A with payoff 600) or a risky alternative (Alternative B,
generating the payoff 1000 if the investigation is not successful with probability
(1 − p) or the payoff 0 if the investigation is successful with probability p). Af-
ter choosing, all decision makers receive the respective amount for the moment.
Choices are private information and unknown to all other players.
Stage 2 (authority): The authority now chooses whether to investigate one
decision maker to reveal her alternative choice, or not.
• If the authority decides against an investigation, all decision makers keep the
payment received in Stage 1. The authority receives nothing and the game
continues with Stage 3.
• If the authority decides in favor of an investigation, one decision maker is
selected, the suspect. All other decision makers, i.e. all decision makers but
the suspect, keep the payment according to their choice in Stage 1. The
investigation of the suspect is successful with probability p. In case of an
unsuccessful investigation the suspect keeps the payment received in Stage 1
and the authority receives nothing. Otherwise, the authority finds out the
alternative chosen by the suspect in Stage 1. If the suspect chose Alternative
A, she can keep the reward. If the suspect chose Alternative B, she loses the
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risky payoff and ends up with nothing. The authority then receives the lost
amount (1000) and the game continues with Stage 3.
Stage 3 (payment and feedback): After (final) payments are carried out, every
player is finally given the information (1) whether the authority decided to investi-
gate (2) the player that was selected (3) success or failure of the investigation and
(4) the individual payoff.
See Table 4.1 for an overview of the game. In summary, while the decision maker
choosing the risky alternative, Alternative B, can lose her payoff upon successful
investigation, she always keeps the payoff when choosing the certain alternative,
Alternative A. The authority has an incentive to always conduct an investigation.
4.2.2 Formal predictions
For our theoretical analysis, we focus on decision makers only. We do not formally
represent the authority in our model. We assume a set of I risk-neutral players,
i.e decision makers. The number of players is n = |I|. We assume that per period,
only one decision maker can be selected for investigation. Hence, the objective
probability of selection results in δ = 1
n
. In Stage 1 of the game, every player i
chooses her strategy σi ∈ Σi with Σi = {′A′;′B′}. Further, we assume that the
probability of successful detection p(σ) depends on the strategy profile all decision
makers play. We closer analyze this aspect in subsection 4.2.3.
The payoff function is given by Hi(σi, σ−i). As the payoff from choosing the sure
Alternative A can be kept in any case, the player receives 600 as shown in formula
4.1.
Hi(
′A′, σ−i) = 600 (4.1)
The payoff for choosing the risky Alternative B is
Hi(
′B′, σ−i) = (1− δ)1000 + δ[p(σ)× 0 + (1− p(σ))× 1000] (4.2)
In formula 4.2 we obtain the expected payoff considering the two scenarios when
decision maker i is not selected for investigation with probability (1− δ) as well as
the case in which the decision maker is selected for investigation with probability
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δ. After being selected, the probability p(σ) determines wether the investigation is
conducted successfully, or not (1− p(σ)).
Player i chooses Alternative A, if Hi(′A′, σ−i) > Hi(′B′, σ−i). Transformation of
this inequality results in
p(σ) >
2
5δ
= 0.4n
Hence, in a game with three or more risk neutral decision makers, choosing Alter-
native B is better than choosing Alternative A.
4.2.3 Influence of strategy profile on p
In this subsection, we consider two different methods to calculate p(σ): (1) p(σ)
is exogenously given and (2) p(σ) depends on the number of participants playing
the risky strategy, i.e. Strategy B. We call the game in line with (1) Basic Game
and assume that pB(σ) = 1 holds for the Basic Game, while we call (2) Extended
Game.
Introducing the Extended Game is motivated by Lui (1986). There, the prob-
ability of successful detection p(σ) monotonically decreases with the number of
decision makers choosing Alternative B. This reduces the likelihood of an authority
auditing the suspect successfully because of the greater prevalence of misbehavior.
Lui (1986) uses corruption by way of example, as do we. Formally, we let pE(σ)
in the Extended Game depend on the number of decision makers i ∈ {1, .., n} who
have chosen Alternative B in Stage 1 of the game. The probability of successful
detection is:
pE(σ) = 1− 0.05× (i− 1) for i ∈ {1, .., n} and n ≤ 21
In case all decision makers have chosen Alternative A (hence i = 0 players chose
Alternative B), a search is conducted with pE(σ) = 1 anyway.
Results can differ between Basic Game and Extended Game as the probability of
successful detection depends on the other players’ alternative choices in the latter
scenario. Assume in a game with 21 decision makers, all decision makers choose the
risky Alternative B. Then, even the investigated player will receive 1000 since no
investigation is successful with pE(σ) = 0. With an increasing number of players
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choosing Alternative A, the payoff decreases until only one decision maker (i.e.
player i) solely chooses Alternative B. In this case, the probability of successful
detection pE(σ) is 1. Figuratively speaking, player i is the only corrupt player in
the population and therefor easy to detect for an authority.
Consider that being the only one choosing Alternative B results in equivalent
formal predictions as for the Basic Game, as pE(σ) = pB(σ) = 1 holds. All other
players {1, .., i − 1, i + 1, .., n} receive the sure payoff 600. If the game is played
with three or more decision makers, we can see that the risky Alternative B is more
attractive in the Extended Game than in the Basic Game. The expected payoff
from choosing the risky Alternative B in the Extended Game then is always higher
or at least equal to the expected payoff of the Basic Game for any decision maker
i ∈ {1, .., n} with n ≤ 21. We obtain this formal result although the situation
itself is more ambiguous as every decision maker lacks necessary information as
compared to the Basic Game. The other players’ alternative choices are unknown
but crucially relevant for the individual payoff in the Extended Game. In the Basic
Game, this information is not needed.
4.3 Hypotheses
Introducing the role for an authority into an economic experiment allows us to
implement different detection mechanisms while maintaining the same exogenously
given probability of suspect selection δ = 1
n
. With our mechanisms for suspect
selection either being (1) random or (2) by direct choice of a human authority, we
vary the degree of uncertainty. Whereas random selection with a fixed probability
is a risky situation, selection by an authority is perceived to be ambiguous. Im-
plementing those two selection mechanisms creates two comparable scenarios. In
(1), suspect selection is computerized and random whereas in (2) the human au-
thority chooses directly by a certain strategy. We are able to observe and analyze
behavioral aspects regarding decision-making under risk (random selection) and
decision-making under ambiguity (selection by choice).
Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961) challenged expected utility for decision-making
under uncertainty. Since then an increasing amount of literature on behavioral
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aspects regarding risky, ambiguous and uncertain events has emerged. Camerer
and Weber (1992) provide an excellent overview of subsequent studies on Daniel
Ellsberg’s findings and Wakker (2010) reviews commonly applied theories of choice.
In case of uncertain events Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Tversky and Wakker (1995)
point out that not only the degree, but also the source of uncertainty matters for
decision makers. With respect to this source dependence, we hypothesize:
H1: The underlying selection mechanism affects the decision makers’
choices.
The concept of ambiguity aversion originates from the experiments of Ellsberg
(1961) in which decision makers prefer bets on events with known probabilities.
Camerer and Weber (1992) also suggest that missing information is upsetting and
scary and therefore makes people prefer risk (known probabilities) to ambiguity
(unknown probabilities). As the amount of missing information can be understood
as the degree of ambiguity (Camerer, 1999) we formulate two hypotheses:
H2a: The ratio of risky choices is lower in situations that are subject
to ambiguity.
H2b: The higher the degree of ambiguity, the lower the ratio of risky
choices.
In both, Hypothesis H2a and H2b, we increase the degree of ambiguity. However,
the initial situation differs. While we have a risky (unambiguous) situation in H2a
to begin with, Hypothesis H2b postulates some level of ambiguity to be already in
place.
4.4 The experiment
In this section, we first present the experimental design to introduce our four treat-
ments. Then we provide some background information about the experimental
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procedure in subsection 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Experimental design
We chose treatment-specific variables with regard to the detection mechanism. We
implement an overall of four treatments which differ (1) in the way suspects are
selected and (2) whether the probability of successful detection is determined by the
strategy profile of all decision makers (strategic uncertainty), or not. The suspect
selection mechanism of a participant in the role of the authority is either "random"
(RANDOM) or "by choice" (BY CHOICE). Therefore, the differences between the
treatments are as follows:
• RANDOM: In case the participant representing the authority decides to have
an insight into the alternative choice of one decision maker, the suspect is
selected randomly by a computer.
• BY CHOICE: Here, upon her decision to conduct a search, the participant
representing the authority chooses one decision maker directly.
The difference between the subject selection mechanisms is embedded in the
instructions by only changing the sentence "The subject is selected randomly." in
(RANDOM) to "The subject is chosen by the authority directly." in (BY CHOICE)
(see Appendix B.3 for instructions).
The influence of strategic uncertainty is reflected in differences between the treat-
ments as follows:
• Without strategic uncertainty (RANDOM or BY CHOICE): The investiga-
tion of every selected suspect is successful with probability pB(σ) = 1. Every
decision maker who chooses the risky Alternative B and is investigated re-
ceives 0. In other words, these treatments represent the Basic Game.
• With strategic uncertainty (RANDOMgroup and BY CHOICEgroup): After
a suspect is selected for investigation, the success of the investigation depends
on the number of other decision makers choosing Alternative B, i.e. pE(σ).
These treatments represent the Extended Game.
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That leaves us with four treatments (see Table 4.2 for an overview). According to
the classification distinctions for decision-making under uncertainty, we categorize
the treatments as shown in Table 4.2 as static or dynamic and as risky or ambiguous.
• RANDOM: In the case that the participant representing the authority
decides to have an insight into the alternative choice of one decision
maker, the suspect is selected randomly by a computer.
• BY CHOICE: Here, upon the decision to conduct a search, the partic-
ipant representing the authority chooses one decision maker directly.
The diﬀerence between the subject selection mechanisms is embedded in
the instructions by only changing the sentence ”The subject is selected ran-
domly.” in (RANDOM) to ”The subject is chosen by the authority directly.”
in (BY CHOICE) (see Appendix A for instructions).
The inﬂuence of strategic uncertainty is reﬂected in diﬀerences between the
treatments as follows:
• Without strategic uncertainty (RANDOM or BY CHOICE): The inves-
tigation of every selected suspect is successful with probability pB(σ) =
1. Every decision maker who chooses the risky Alternative B and is
investigated receives 0. In other words, these treatments represent the
Basic Game.
• With strategic uncertainty (RANDOMgroup and BY CHOICEgroup):
After a suspect is selected for investigation, the success of the investi-
gation depends on the number of other decision makers choosing Alter-
native B, i.e. pE(σ). These treatments represent the Extended Game.
structure of the game [group
dependence]
BASIC EXTENDED
suspect
selection
mecha-
nism
[authority]
RANDOM
RANDOM RANDOMgroup
static|risky dynamic|ambiguous
BY CHOICE
BY CHOICE BY CHOICEgroup
static|ambiguous dynamic|ambiguous
Table 2: Classiﬁcation of treatments
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Table 4.2: lassification of treatments
By "static" we describe the decision-making independent from other decision
makers in the group (pB(σ) = 1) and with "dynamic" we capture the dependence
on the other decision makers for the generation of pE(σ). Given the known proba-
bility of selection in RANDOM, this is a risky situation. Handing over the subject
selection to the authority in BY CHOICE, the decision is no longer made probabilis-
tically and the situation cannot be expressed by a probability in the sense of Knight
(1921). However, the likelihood of being selected is (objectively) equally probable
with δ = 1
n
. Both situations exhibit ambiguity over outcomes but changing the un-
derlying selection mechanism results in some missing information in BY CHOICE:
The strategy of the authority. Therefore, BY CHOICE exhibits ambiguity over
probability. These degrees of ambiguity are fundamentally different (Camerer and
Weber, 1992). In contrast to the treatments of the Basic Game, RANDOMgroup
and BY CHOICEgroup both have a selection mechanism that passes through two
stochastic processes. First, the selection probability δ = 1
n
and second, the prob-
ability of successful detection p(σ), which depends on the strategy profile of all
decision makers. Hence, decision makers also have to form beliefs about the other
decision makers’ actions, as they are relevant for the individual expected payoff.
In addition to this strategic uncertainty, selection by direct human choice in BY
CHOICEgroup raises the degree of ambiguity yet again.
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Having a closer look at Table 4.2, the results of the experiment can be compared
regarding ambiguity in the way subjects are being selected by the authority (RAN-
DOM versus BY CHOICE) and the additional increase of uncertainty (Basic Game
versus Extended Game) for each two treatments.
4.4.2 Experimental procedure
As the application of our research focus is not necessarily bound to one specific
setting of illegitimate activity, we run an experiment using neutrally worded in-
structions. Thereby, we are also able to abstain from moral standards and focus on
behavioral aspects only.
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics
at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). There were 9 groups of 7 participants
in each of the 4 treatments. Thus, one group consisted of one authority and n = 6
decision makers. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and a total of
252 students across all fields of study took part in the experiment. Earnings were
recorded in ECU (experimental currency unit) with a conversion rate of ECU100
being e 0.05. On top of their cumulative earnings, each participant was rewarded
a e 5 show-up fee. Students were paid anonymously at the end of each session.
Experimental sessions lasted about 30 minutes and average earnings were e 10.98.
Maximum and minimum payments were e 12.5 and e 7, respectively. The experi-
ment was conducted under laboratory conditions. Upon arrival, participants were
randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals and matched to groups
with 6 other participants for all 15 periods. The instructions were read aloud and
all questions were answered privately. The experiment was programmed and con-
ducted with the z-Tree application developed by Fischbacher (2007).
4.5 Results
To analyze our research hypotheses we focus on the average share of risky Alterna-
tive B choices per group (see Table 4.3).
First, we compare treatments with different underlying selection mechanisms
and study whether this difference in the source of uncertainty influences the play-
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ers’ behavior (Hypothesis H1). Then we evaluate Hypothesis H2a and H2b as we
investigate the ratio of risky Alternative B choices with respect to the degree of
uncertainty.
observation/ RANDOM BY CHOICE RANDOM BY CHOICE
group group group
1 84.4% 66.7% 74.4% 55.6%
2 90.0% 53.3% 60.0% 77.8%
3 73.3% 37.8% 78.9% 75.6%
4 88.9% 71.1% 65.6% 56.7%
5 58.9% 64.4% 73.3% 58.9%
6 88.9% 75.6% 67.8% 55.6%
7 94.4% 54.4% 82.2% 74.4%
8 72.2% 70.0% 55.6% 74.4%
9 76.7% 74.4% 67.8% 61.1%
ø 80.9% 63.1% 69.5% 65.6%
Table 4.3: Relative shares of Alternative B choices per group
The average shares of Alternative B choices in Table 4.3 can also be understood
from Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Alternative choices
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4.5.1 Changing the selection mechanism
According to our research Hypothesis H1 we expect the underlying selection mech-
anism to affect the decision makers’ choices. Having a closer look at the results of
the Basic Game (Treatment RANDOM and Treatment BYCOICE) in Table 4.3,
we observe that the average share of participants playing the risky choice (Alterna-
tive B) is 17,8% lower in Treatment BY CHOICE than in Treatment RANDOM.
Apparently, the suspect selection mechanism does influence the players’ behavior.
A two-sided Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test confirms on a significance level of 1%
(p = 0.007) that the average choice of risky Alternative B in Treatment RANDOM
is different from the average choice in Treatment BY CHOICE.
Comparing both treatments with strategic uncertainty (Treatment RANDOM-
group and Treatment BY CHOICEgroup) we also observe a reduction in choices of
risky Alternative B. A binomial test confirms the significance of the reduction (one-
sided, α=0.1). With regard to Hypothesis H1 we conclude that there is a difference
between random suspect selection and selection by direct choice of an authority.
However, the overall decrease of 3.9% in average choice of the risky Alternative
B in the Extended Game is rather small compared to the same effect (an overall
reduction of 17.8%) in the Basic Game.
4.5.2 Raising the degree of ambiguity
According to our research Hypothesis H2a, the ratio of risky choices is lower in sit-
uations that are subject to ambiguity. To analyze this hypothesis we take into ac-
count the treatments where ambiguity is introduced. On the one hand we compare
Treatment RANDOM and Treatment BY CHOICE because of the ambiguity due
to change in the selection mechanism (see subsection 4.5.1). On the other hand, we
compare Treatment RANDOM and Treatment RANDOMgroup. Here, having ran-
dom selection in both treatments, Treatment RANDOMgroup exhibits ambiguity
due to strategic uncertainty. We find a significant decrease in risky choices (Alterna-
tive B) in both cases (RANDOM/BY CHOICE: one-sided MWU test, p = 0.0035;
and RANDOM/RANDOMgroup: one-sided MWU test, p = 0.0235). These results
confirm our Hypothesis H2a.
Participants in Treatment RANDOMgroup show a significantly higher security
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orientation than in participants in Treatment RANDOM (one-sided MWU test,
p = 0.0235) with an overall reduction of more than 11% in risky choices. The
suspect selection mechanism is the same (random selection). However, the prob-
ability of getting caught in Treatment RANDOMgroup is always lower or equal
to Treatment RANDOM, regardless of the number of participants choosing the
risky Alternative B. Despite this fact, a smaller fraction of participants chooses the
risky Alternative B in every round (see Figure 4.2). Because of that, we ascribe
this outcome to the increased degree of ambiguity due to strategic uncertainty in
Treatment RANDOMgroup.
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Figure 4.2: Alternative B choices per round
A recent study by Serra (2012) on the combination of top-down and bottom-
up accountability in a bribery lab experiment shows similar results. Serra (2012)
compares treatments with (1) no monitoring, (2) top-down auditing (only) and
(3) a combined accountability system (top-down and bottom-up). Contrary to her
prediction, she finds no statistically significant differences between (1) and (2) but
between (1) and (3). She suggests conjunction fallacy in probability judgement
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) as a possible reason for the outcome. While Serra
(2012) finds these results for small probabilities of being detected (0% to a maximum
of 4% in Treatment (2) top-down auditing), our results provide evidence for the
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same effect with rather high probabilities of detection (12.5% to a maximum of
16.7% in Treatment RANDOMgroup).
Finally we evaluate Hypothesis H2b. As we further increase the degree of ambigu-
ity, we expect to see an increasingly lower ratio of risky choices (Alternative B). By
making the probability of successful detection depend on the strategy profile of all
decision makers in Treatment RANDOMgroup and Treatment BY CHOICEgroup,
we raise the degree of ambiguity since less information is available than in Treatment
RANDOM and Treatment BY CHOICE, respectively. Treatment BY CHOICE ex-
hibits ambiguity about probability as the decision makers lack information about
the authority’s intended strategy. Treatment RANDOMgroup exhibits ambiguity
due to strategic uncertainty through dynamic decision-making. In either case, the
degree of ambiguity is still lower than in Treatment BY CHOICEgroup, where both
pieces of information are missing. Comparing these three treatments we do not find
statistically significant behavioral differences (BY CHOICE/RANDOMgroup/BY
CHOICEgroup: two-sided MWU test, p > 0.1). Apparently, increasing uncertainty
further does not affect the players behavior, if yet a certain degree of uncertainty
is already prevalent. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis H2b.
4.6 Conclusion
Our study contributes to the experimental literature on decision-making under un-
certainty by taking into account the explicit role of an authority in an experimental
design. By applying different detection mechanisms, we are able to (1) vary the
source of uncertainty and to (2) implement different degrees of uncertainty. Com-
paring decision-making in risky situations to decision-making under ambiguity, we
find significant differences in the observed behavior. These results are consistent
with the idea of ambiguity-aversion (Ellsberg, 1961) where people decide in favor of
events with "better" known probabilities. While in Ellsberg (1961) the ambiguous
situation is created by missing information about the composition of the ambigu-
ous urn, we use a different approach to analyze decision-making under ambiguity.
We model an explicit role in the experimental design and have a strategically act-
ing authority present. Although the objective probability of detection is common
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knowledge, the intended strategy of investigation is unknown to all decision makers
and generates the ambiguous situation.
Introducing ambiguity, we find behavioral differences when the underlying sus-
pect selection mechanism is randomized (RANDOM vs. RANDOMgroup). Here,
even objectively better alternatives turn out to be less desired by the experimental
subjects. Increasing the degree of ambiguity further, we do not find behavioral dif-
ferences regardless of the source of uncertainty (BY CHOICE and RANDOMgroup
vs. BY CHOICEgroup). This suggests that an even higher degree of ambiguity
has only little to no influence on decision makers’ behavior if yet a certain level
of uncertainty is already in place. With random detection being the treatment
where misbehavior is most prevalent in our experiment, we appreciate the advan-
tages of endogenizing detection probabilities in new theoretical and experimental
contributions studying deterrence mechanisms.
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In this thesis, we provide new evidence on three specific policy and regulatory issues
by means of economic experimentation. Based on our results, we are able to gain
further insights in the areas of (1) competition policy design, (2) price regulation
and (3) decision-making under ambiguity in an IO context.
We run a cartel simulation in Chapter 2 where we analyze the effects of discrim-
inating cartel ringleaders from leniency application. By implementing different
leniency programs, we find that recognizing cartel ringleaders for full immunity
from fines significantly deters cartel formation, increases instances of reporting and
ultimately leads to lower market prices. Thus, our results suggest that antitrust
policy should be designed to make cartel ringleaders eligible for leniency applica-
tion. Since we find similar results for either a leniency program with immunity
from fines or a 50% fine reduction, the latter mechanism appears to be sufficient to
accomplish the objectives and, therefore, should be favored over granting immunity
upon reporting. In case of a 50% reduction in fines, even a ringleader is given an
incentive to report the infringement, while, the offender does not get off completely
unpunished.
In Chapter 3 we have a closer look at the functioning of a specific price-regulatory
mechanism, the so called Austrian rule. Austria adopted the revised Gasoline Price
Regulation Act which came into effect on January 1, 2010. Since then, increases
in gasoline prices by gas station operators have only been possible once a day at
12 pm (noon). Price reductions, however, are permitted at any time of the day.
As the beneficial character of this rule was challenged by competition experts, we
investigate the regulation scheme in an experiment. Our results suggest that the
Austrian rule supports coordination and thereby facilitates collusion: Our regu-
lated experimental market yields less volatile but significantly higher market prices
compared to our unregulated experimental market. We are able to observe a dis-
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tinct pricing pattern which can be attributed to the increased level of transparency,
as competitors’ actions are more predictable under the Austrian rule. We deem a
regulatory mechanism along the lines of the Austrian rule to be counterproductive
if maximizing welfare is the aim of the intended regulation.
In our third experiment (Chapter 4), we analyze decision-making under ambigu-
ity. We introduce an explicit role for a strategically acting authority and investigate
the impact on misbehavior experimentally. We implement treatments with either
a random selection mechanism or selection by direct human choice, thus turning a
risky situation into an ambiguous one. Based on economic literature on corruption,
we extend this setup by making the risk of being detected depend inversely on the
ratio of offenders. We find that the presence of a strategically acting authority
positively affects deterrence, despite the same objective probability of detection
compared to being randomly investigated. Due to an increase in the degree of
uncertainty, the prevalence of misbehavior decreases significantly.
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A.1 Ringleader Experiment (Chapter 2)
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Figure A.1: Cumulative distribution function of agreed-upon prices
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Figure A.3: Group average prices per round in REG
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Figure A.4: Group average prices per round in NREG
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Figure A.5: Group average prices per round in REG(FI)
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Figure A.6: Group average prices per round in NREG(FI)
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Since we performed the experiments at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT),
Karlsruhe, Germany, the original instructions were written in German. Instructions
in the original formatting and language can be obtained from the author. In the
following, we append translated instructions for each of the three experiments we
described above. Additionally, formatting is changed to save some space. We
highlight the differences between the respective Treatments.
B.1 Ringleader Experiment (Chapter 2)
You are taking part in an economic experiment. During the experiment you can
earn money. How much you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions
of other participants you are matched with. Every participant operates a visu-
ally isolated computer terminal and decides on her own. Communication between
participants is not allowed.
In the experiment, you are a member of a group of three participants. Group
assignments are carried out randomly at the beginning of the experiment, and the
composition of the group stays the same for all periods. You don’t know the iden-
tity of your group members, neither do they know yours. Each group consists of
two "participants" and one "organizer". The roles are randomly assigned at the
beginning of each period and are visualized on the computer screen at any time of
the experiment.
Each of the 3 group members produces the same product and wants to sell one unit
for a price p, with p ∈ {101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110}.
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Only the player choosing the lowest price (market price) has current period earn-
ings according to pi = (p − 100/L), where L is the number of players who have
simultaneously chosen the lowest price p: in case more than one player chose the
same (lowest) price, earnings are split up equally (divided in half, or by three).
Players with a price higher than the market price do not have earnings in this pe-
riod (earnings equal 0).
Every period of the experiment can be structured in 5 stages:
Stage 1: Agree or disagree to join price discussions
Every player can decide whether to join or not to join a non-binding price discus-
sion, before individually sets a market price. The discussion only takes place if all
3 group members unanimously agree to join the price discussion.
If no discussion takes place, every group member individually chooses a market
price according to Stage 2.
If a discussion takes place, all group members begin a non-binding price discussion,
before individually setting a market price. In the discussion, every player may
submit an individually accepted minimum- and maximum price of the price range
{101, 102, ..., 110}. A submitted price range has to be within the price range that
is (at the moment) accepted by all group members. This accepted price range is
visualized as two large, red numbers in the center of the screen and is updated in
real time (see screenshots). If a submitted price range is not within the accepted
price range, the player is asked to decide whether to (1) quit the discussion or (2)
submit a new price range. In case (1), the discussion ends without an agreed-upon
price, but the discussion has taken place. In case (2), the discussion continues. If
only one value is submitted as both, a minimum- and maximum price, this price
cannot be changed any further. Non-binding price discussions are possible for 30
seconds until there is no more price range available, but one agreed-upon price.
The discussion screen closes after 30 seconds, even if there is no agreed-upon price.
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Cumulative distribution function of agreed‐upon prices 
(a) Input
Cumulative distribution function of agreed‐upon prices 
(b) Real-time output
Stage 2: Individual pricing decision
Every player individually chooses a price p out of {101, 102, ..., 110}. The choice is
private information. Prices are simultaneously chosen by all group members and
only the lowest of the three prices chosen (the market price) will then be public
information.
Depending on all decisions made in Stage 1, the experiment continues with
Stage 3, if a discussion took place, or in
Stage 5, if no discussion took place.
Stage 3: Reporting
Stage 3 and Stage 4 only occur, if all players unanimously agreed to join a discus-
sion in Stage 1.
[SYM, ASYM50: Every group member] [ASYM, ASYMhigh: Both par-
ticipants, but not the organizer,] may report their participation in the discus-
sion. The report is private information; no other player will learn who reported the
participation. Reporting always costs 1 ECU (experimental currency unit). After
a report, each player’s earnings (pi) are reduced by 10% of current period revenue.
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For players choosing the market-price, current period revenues are (pmarket/L). Net
earnings therefore are pi − 0.1 × (pmarket/L). Players that chose a price above the
market price in Stage 2, do not have any revenue and will therefore experience no
reduction (0.1× 0 = 0). Their net earnings still equal 0.
[SYM: The one group member who first reports the discussion will not
experience a reduction in earnings.] [ASYM, ASYMhigh: The one par-
ticipant who first reports the discussion will not experience a reduction
in earnings.] [ASYM50: The reduction in earnings of 10% of current
period revenues does not apply for the player who reports first. If a
participant reports first, her earnings will not be reduced. Net earn-
ings are pi − 0 × 0.1 × (pmarket/L). If the organizer reports first, earnings
will be reduced by 5% of current period revenue. Net earnings are
pi − 0.5× 0.1× (pmarket/L).]
Stage 4: Investigation
This stage only occurs, if the discussion has not been reported in Stage 3. The
participation of all 3 group members in a discussion will be detected with a prob-
ability of [SYM, ASYM, ASYM50: 15%] [ASYMhigh: 75%]. In case of
a successful detection, earnings of all players are reduced by 10% of the current
period revenue. The agreement, to join a price discussion may therefore (Stage 3
and Stage 4) result in negative net earnings. If, however, no discussion takes place
after Stage 2, both Stage 3 and Stage 4 will not occur in the respective period.
Stage 5: Information
You are told all relevant information of the current period. Your net earnings will
be added to your overall earnings.
Every period of the experiment follows the logic of these 5 Stages. In the ex-
periment, there are at least 20 periods in total. After period 20, another period
begins with a probability of 80%, or the experiment ends with a probability of 20%.
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Payment
Each player’s per period earnings will be accumulated. You start the experiment
with an amount of 24 ECU, which will be available throughout the experiment. In
case a (possible) reduction of current period earnings is larger than current period
earnings themselves, the negative value (loss) will be offset against your overall
balance and you will be informed about it. Overall earnings in ECU will be con-
verted into Euro, where 1 ECU is worth 0.25 Euro. Payment will be carried out
individually and anonymously after the experiment.
Before the beginning of the experiment, there will be 5 practice periods. All earn-
ings gained in these 5 periods will not be added to the overall earnings of the
experiment. After the practice periods, all questions will be answered privately.
Subjects and groups will then be rematched and the experiment begins.
B.2 Gasoline Experiment (Chapter 3)
The same Payoff-Table and its explanation (Appendix B.2.1) was handed out to all
participants in every treatment. Regarding the computerized questionnaire men-
tioned in subsection 3.6, we provide, by way of illustration, the REG(FI)-Treatment
comprehension questions in subsection B.2.3.
B.2.1 Payoff-Table
the other participant
number 4 3 2 1
yo
u
4 28|28 15|30 10|34 5 |38
3 30|15 22|22 16|27 10|30
2 34|10 27|16 20|20 13|22
1 38| 5 30|10 22|13 14|14
The numbers which can be chosen by you are displayed in the head of each row. The
numbers which can be chosen by the other participant are displayed in the head of
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each column. The payments associated with a combination of numbers are shown
in the corresponding cell. The entry on the left side of the vertical bar corresponds
to your payment. The entry on the right side of the vertical bar corresponds to the
other participant’s payment.
B.2.2 Instructions
Welcome to our experiment!
Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your neighbors during the
entire experiment. Raise your hand if you have questions. We will come around
and answer your question privately. Your participation in the experiment will be
rewarded. Depending on your behavior and the behavior of other participants you
are matched with, you receive lower or higher monetary rewards in EUR.
You interact with another participant. Both participants each make one decision
per round. Making a decision means choosing a number. The resulting combina-
tion of numbers is associated with a payment for each participant. The payments
associated with each combination of numbers are shown in the attached table and
on the screen.
The numbers which can be chosen by you are displayed in the head of each row. The
numbers which can be chosen by the other participant are displayed in the head of
each column. The payments associated with a combination of numbers are shown
in the corresponding cell. The entry on the left side of the vertical bar corresponds
to your payment. The entry on the right side of the vertical bar corresponds to
the other participant’s payment. The payments are quoted in ECU (experimental
currency unit). The exchange rate between ECU and EUR is 1/75. That is, 75
ECU are exchanged for 1 EUR.
How are the decisions made?
You and the other participant decide simultaneously. That is, you choose your
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number (pick a row), and the other participant chooses his number (picks a col-
umn). If both decisions are made, you and the other participant will be informed
about the choices. With that, a round is finished. That is, at the end of a round,
each participant knows (i) his number, (ii) the other participant’s number, (iii) his
payment, and (iv) the other participant’s payment. Decisions are communicated
electronically. Items (i) to (iv) are automatically recorded and displayed. The sum
of your payments from all previous rounds is visible during the whole experiment.
[REG: There are at least 31 rounds: round 0, round 1, . . . , round 30,
and so on. After round 30, the probability of an additional round is 5/6.
That is, the probability of continuation is about 83 percent from round
30 onwards. Decisions are automatically made in round 0. For both of
you, number 3 is chosen. You and the other participant decide on your
own in the following rounds. Both of you have to follow the following
decision rule: In each round, you can choose the same number as in
the preceding round, or you can choose a lower number. You are only
allowed to choose a higher number in rounds 5 and 20, 35, and so on.]
[NREG: There are at least 31 rounds: round 0, round 1, . . . , round 30,
and so on. After round 30, the probability of an additional round is 5/6.
That is, the probability of continuation is about 83 percent from round
30 onwards. Decisions are automatically made in round 0. For both of
you, number 3 is chosen. You and the other participant decide on your
own in the following rounds.]
[REG(FI): There are 31 rounds: round 0, round 1, . . . , round 30. Deci-
sions are automatically made in round 0. For both of you, number 3 is
chosen. You and the other participant decide on your own in the follow-
ing rounds. Both of you have to follow the following decision rule: In
each round, you can choose the same number as in the preceding round,
or you can choose a lower number. You are only allowed to choose a
higher number in rounds 5 and 20.]
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[NREG(FI): There are 31 rounds: round 0, round 1, . . . , round 30. De-
cisions are automatically made in round 0. For both of you, number
3 is chosen. You and the other participant decide on your own in the
following rounds.]
You do not know the participant you interact with. You will be randomly assigned
to a participant in round 0. This assignment remains fixed throughout all rounds.
Anonymity among participants and towards experimenters is preserved. Your de-
cisions can only be traced back to your identifier. Your personal data will not be
associated with your identifier.
The sum of your payments from all rounds determines the variable part of your
monetary reward in EUR. In addition, you will receive a fixed amount of 5 EUR.
Your monetary reward will be paid out in private. That is, the other participants
will not learn about the amount of your monetary reward.
B.2.3 Questionnaire
Raise your hand if you have problems answering the questions. We will come to
you and answer your question privately.
Question 1
Decisions are automatically made in round 0. For both of you, number 3 is chosen.
What is your payment and what is the other participant’s payment in round 0?
My payment is . . . [22]. . . ECU.
The other participant’s payment is . . . [22]. . . ECU.
Question 2
Assume you choose the number 4 whereas the other participant chooses the number
1. What is your payment and what is the other participant’s payment in this round?
My payment is . . . [5]. . . ECU.
The other participant’s payment is . . . [38]. . . ECU.
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Question 3
Assume you decide to choose the number 1 whereas the other participant chooses
the number 4. What is your payment and what is the other participant’s payment
in this round?
My payment is . . . [38]. . . ECU.
The other participant’s payment is . . . [5]. . . ECU.
Question 4
Decisions are automatically made in round 0. For both of you, number 3 is chosen.
Which numbers may be chosen by you and by the other participant in round 1?
I may choose the number(s) . . . [3, 2 or 1]. . . .
The other participant may choose the number(s) . . . [3, 2 or 1]. . . .
Question 5
Assume you decide to choose the number 2 in round 1 whereas the other participant
chooses the number 1. Which numbers may be chosen by you and by the other
participant in round 2?
I may choose the number(s) . . . [2 or 1]. . . .
The other participant may choose the number(s) . . . [1]. . . .
Question 6
Which numbers may be chosen by you and by the other participant in rounds 5,
20, 35, and so on?
I may choose the number(s) . . . [4, 3, 2, or 1 (all)]. . . .
The other participant may choose the number(s) . . . [4, 3, 2, or 1 (all)]. . . .
B.2.4 Post-experimental questionnaire
Please answer the following questions:
Questions regarding the experiment
(1) Did you choose your actions carefully?
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 yes
 no
Comments to (1): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Are you satisfied with your decisions?
 yes
 no
Comments to (2): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(3) How do you evaluate the comprehensibility of the instructions?
 easy to comprehend
 difficult to comprehend
Comments to (3): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personal questions
(4) What sex are you?
 male
 female
(5) How old are you?
. . . . . . years
(6) Which faculty are you affiliated with?
 01 Architecture
 02 Civil Engineering, Geo- and Environmental Sciences
 03 Chemistry and Biosciences
 04 Chemical and Process Engineering
 05 Electrical Engineering and Information Technology
 06 Humanities and Social Sciences
 07 Informatics
 08 Mechanical Engineering
 09 Mathematics
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 10 Physics
 11 Economics and Business Engineering
 12 other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thank you!
B.3 Ambiguity Experiment (Chapter 4)
B.3.1 Basic Game: RANDOM and BY CHOICE
You are taking part in a decision experiment. During the experiment you can earn
money. How much you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of
the other participants. Every participant makes his decisions on his own at his
computer box. Communication between participants is not allowed.
In this experiment you are a member of a group of seven participants. This group
consists of six decision makers and one authority. The role and group assignments
are carried out randomly at the beginning of the experiment. The composition of
the group stays the same for all 15 periods. In every period the decision makers
are faced with the situation of step 1:
Step 1: Every decision maker decides between a secure payoff (Alternative A) and
a risky payoff (Alternative B). The choice is private information and only known to
the decision maker. Payoffs are calculated in ECU (experimental currency unit).
Depending on the respective alternative choice, payoffs are being credited (for the
moment).
Alternative A Alternative B
Decision makers´ temporary payoff 600 1000
Authority conducts an investigation Yes No Yes No
Decision makers´ payoff 600 600 0 1000
Authority´s payoff 0 0 1000 0
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Step 2: After all payoffs have been credited, the authority decides whether to reveal
one alternative choice, or not. If the authority decides in favor of an investigation,
only one decision maker is selected to be investigated. [RANDOM: The sub-
ject is selected randomly.][BY CHOICE: The subject is chosen by the
authority directly.] The selected decision maker can keep his payoff if he has
chosen Alternative A in step 1. If he has chosen Alternative B, the payoff is being
deducted and the authority is rewarded with this payoff. According to that, the
decision maker earns nothing in this period.
Payments: Total earnings are calculated as a sum of the payoffs of all 15 periods. In
addition to the earnings, participants receive a fixed participation fee that does not
depend on the decisions. This participation fee is ECU10000. At the end of the ex-
periment all earnings are converted into Euros. The fixed exchange rate is ECU100
= e 0.05. The total earnings will be handed out individually and anonymously.
B.3.2 Extended Game: RANDOMgroup and BY
CHOICEgroup
You are taking part in a decision experiment. During the experiment you can earn
money. How much you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of
the other participants. Every participant makes his decisions on his own at his
computer box. Communication between participants is not allowed.
In this experiment you are a member of a group of seven participants. This group
consists of six decision makers and one authority. The role and group assignments
are carried out randomly at the beginning of the experiment. The composition of
the group stays the same for all 15 periods. In every period the decision makers
are faced with the situation of step 1:
Step 1: Every decision maker decides between a secure payoff (Alternative A) and
a risky payoff (Alternative B). The choice is private information and only known to
the decision maker. Payoffs are calculated in ECU (experimental currency unit).
Depending on the respective alternative choice, payoffs are being credited (for the
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moment).
Alternative A Alternative B
Decision makers´ temporary payoff 600 1000
Authority conducts an investigation Yes No Yes No
Probability of successful detection p(σ) − p(σ) −
Decision makers´ payoff 600 600 0 1000
Authority´s payoff 0 0 1000 0
Step 2: After all payoffs have been credited, the authority decides whether to reveal
one alternative choice, or not. If the authority decides in favor of an investigation,
only one decision maker is selected to be investigated. [RANDOMgroup: The
subject is selected randomly.][BY CHOICEgroup: The subject is chosen
by the authority directly.] The success of the investigation (with p(σ)) depends
on the number of decision makers that have chosen Alternative B in step 1.
Number of Probability of
decision makers that successful detection
chose Alternative B p(σ)
in step 1
1 100%
2 95%
3 90%
4 85%
5 80%
6 75%
If the investigation fails based on the probability of successful detection, the au-
thority is not able to reveal the alternative choice of the selected decision maker.
All participants keep the payoff according to their respective alternative choice.
The authority gets nothing.
If the the investigation is successful, the decision maker is allowed to keep the
(previously) credited payoff only if he chose Alternative A in step 1. If the inves-
tigated decision maker chose Alternative B in step 1, the payoff is being deducted
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and the authority is rewarded with this payoff. According to that, the decision
maker earns nothing in this period.
Payments: Total earnings are calculated as a sum of the payoffs of all 15 periods.
Additionally to the earnings, participants receive a fixed participation fee that does
not depend on the decisions. This participation fee is ECU10000. At the end of
the experiment all earnings are being converted into Euros. The fixed exchange
rate is ECU100 = e 0.05. Total earnings will be handed out individually and
anonymously.
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